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I. INTRODUCTION 
An organizing principle of the rule of law based on individualism 
and order is expressed by the Latin maxim nemo dat quod non habet 
(hereinafter nemo dat for shorthand)—roughly translated to mean that 
one can only give what they have or one can only transfer what they 
own.
1
  It is a matter of only being permitted to do what is within your 
legal authority to do.  I should not be able to sell you a house after I sold 
it to someone yesterday (even if I at one earlier point owned the house) 
any more than I could sell you the Golden Gate Bridge (which I do not 
and never did own).  My lack of authority in each should be the same.  
Once I have sold the thing I previously owned, my right to sell it should 
be irrevocably lost, and the property should no longer be mine to sell any 
more than selling something I never owned at all.  This seems simple 
enough, but the law is seldom so easy.  Markets never operate quite so 
mechanically, and sellers of real property sometimes behave badly (in 
other words, sell property twice or more) instead of behaving benignly 
and in compliance with the nemo dat limitations on what one should be 
allowed to do. 
Instead of operating with a hammer when it comes to sales of 
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 1.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1933 (10th ed. 2014) (“No one gives what he does not 
have; no one transfers (a right) that he does not possess. . . . [N]o one gives a better title to property 
than he himself possesses.”); see also Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544, 550 (1872) (“No one in 
general can sell personal property and convey a valid title to it unless he is the owner or lawfully 
represents the owner.  Nemo dat quod non habet.”).  A related maxim is also relevant here: nemo 
plus juris ad alienum transferre potest quam ipse haberet, which means “no one can transfer to 
another a greater right than he himself might have.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1934 (10th ed. 
2014). 
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property without authority, the law tolerates some curious deviations 
from our expected or desired adherence to the nemo dat paradigm in 
order to advance other policies, including fairness and certainty of title.
2
  
“Ownership” is more textured than one might immediately appreciate.  
With the aid of property recording acts, it becomes true that, in function, 
indeed one can sometimes sell more than they “own.” 
In this Article, the term “dirty deeds” shall take on two related 
meanings.  One, it will represent those deeds (documents) that have been 
marked, or dirtied, by the first sale so that once they get to the second 
purchaser they are no longer clean and no longer entirely free for the 
taking.  It shall also represent deeds (as in actions) that are disfavored, 
disagreeable, and harmful, against which we seek protection and 
deterrence to minimize their occurrence. 
Consider the following example in which dirty deeds and nemo dat 
exceptions collide.  In most jurisdictions, a grantor X might sell 
Blackacre to person Y and then later sell to person Z, and Z might be 
awarded the title to the property so long as Z is a bona fide purchaser 
without notice of the previous conveyance to Y—even though Z might 
take the land by what we could call a “dirty deed” (here used in the 
document form)—where the deed is soiled by its previous conveyance to 
Y rather than being pure, clean, and fit for conveyance to Z; the deed 
seemingly represents property spoiled and incapable of being passed to 
others because it is already sold to another; and the deed is transferred 
                                                          
 2.  In an earlier work related to property recording laws, I focused my attention on deed 
traceability problems in recording associated with the mortgage foreclosure crisis and exacerbated 
by problems related to mortgage-backed securities and MERS.  Donald J. Kochan, Certainty of 
Title: Perspectives After the Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis on the Essential Role of Effective 
Recording Systems, 66 ARK. L. REV. 267 (2013).  That article also spent time developing some 
general background on the recording laws (without much discussion of the differences between 
types of recording statutes) and set forth a defense of the recording system itself as a vital facilitative 
component of a smooth functioning market system.  Id. at 272–78.  It spent particular time justifying 
the recording’s place from a legal/political-philosophy perspective, articulating reasons why the 
state’s role in recording is a necessary and essential foundational component of government even 
from a classical liberal or typically laissez-faire perspective.  Id. at 298–311.  In contrast, this Article 
does not deal with traceability of deeds and assignments nor does it implicate unique concerns 
associated with the mortgage and housing crisis.  Instead, this Article carefully compares the types 
of recording statutes and types of notice.  It then builds further support for the systematic importance 
of recording, but does so by dissecting the pragmatic deviations from the nemo dat principle 
facilitated by the bona fide purchaser exceptions to it in recording statutes.  And, it analyzes the 
relative utility of these exceptions and presents a unique proposal for narrowing the frequency of 
access to those exceptions.  Finally, this Article deals with a set of bad or irresponsible actors—those 
that fraudulently or mistakenly sell property multiple times—not evaluated in the previous work.  
Read together, however, both works contribute to a greater understanding of how the recording 
system works as a pragmatic tool, essential to markets in achieving the desirable ends of furthering 
certainty of title, security of ownership, traceability of deeds, and the smooth transfer of property at 
efficient values. 
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through the dirty deed (here the phrase used in the action form) from X 
who you would think should lack authority to sell Blackacre because he 
has already sold it to Y. 
Despite this not uncommon scenario, it is nonetheless said that the 
principle in the nemo dat maxim underlies our title system and that its 
dictates usually hold true in the operation of land transactions.  Yet we 
also know that the recording statutes calculatingly accommodate 
purposeful exceptions to the nemo dat principle as well, as in the 
example above.  In other words, sometimes the law must ignore the nemo 
dat maxim in favor of other competing policy interests and pragmatic 
concerns in property law, namely certainty issues and the protection of 
bona fide purchasers.  As in so many areas of property law, order matters 
but what one must do in what order is designed to accomplish specific 
ends. 
Whereas strict adherence to nemo dat might be theorized as the 
“first-best” solution to fraudulent and recurrent land conveyances and 
best at adhering to our formalistic tendencies, the realities of property 
make that solution less than satisfactory and make exceptions justifiable.  
We have accepted pragmatically that exceptions must be made and that 
we may have to, in essence, validate fraud at times.
3
  Such validation will 
be a necessary evil when faced with two parties (the first buyer and the 
subsequent bona fide purchaser)—with relatively equal competing 
claims to innocence—that are vying for the same property yet where the 
law can declare only one winner in the contest. 
This confrontation with such contests means that the law may need 
to be satisfied with “second-best” solutions to the “dirty deed” behavior.  
This Article briefly explores some of the second-best solutions we have 
to recurrent transfers of the same land, including incentivizing first takers 
to immediately record, civil lawsuits by the losers in the ownership 
choice against the dirty grantors, and criminal laws that protect society 
and are designed to deter these kinds of dirty deeds in the conveying of 
dirty deeds. 
In Part II, this Article outlines the basic meaning and place of the 
nemo dat principle in our system of law.  It then introduces the tensions 
between the ideal adherence to the maxim and the realities in the world 
that necessitate exceptions to (or a sometimes less-than-ideal 
                                                          
 3.  Audrey G. McFarlane, The Properties of Instability: Markets, Predation, Racialized 
Geography, and Property Law, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 855, 884 (2011) (“[T]here has been a social 
decision within property doctrine to sometimes ratify fraud—the basic issue of why O can pass 
property twice.”). 
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achievement of) the maxim.  That introduction leads to Part III, which is 
intended to provide a valuable summary of the recording acts and their 
purposes, along with the types of notice and their uses, while exposing 
the tensions these recording systems each have with a strict notion of 
nemo dat.  Part III will also do a comparative assessment of different 
types of recording regimes in light of these realities, identifying which 
are better at navigating these tensions. 
Part IV returns to those tensions in detail and explains the purposes 
of the recording acts and why the protections for bona fide purchasers are 
necessary to facilitate markets in property and serve other goals.  It 
reveals what might be called the impossibility of fully enforceable 
property rights in real property.  It draws on case examples—where 
tough choices necessitate choosing certainty over protecting initially 
conferred “rights”—to reflect on why we make such choices.  Part IV 
also explores the role of individual responsibility—particularly as it 
relates to purchaser obligations to record and examine records—as the 
core justification for setting the rules in a manner that may result in first-
in-time titleholders sometimes losing out to subsequent purchasers. 
Finally, Part IV concludes with a defense of the proposition that, 
despite our recognition of some exceptions from nemo dat, the law 
should constantly strive to develop in ways that can better approximate 
full adherence to a nemo dat ideal.  This Article contends that we should 
structure our property law based on a preference for achieving the nemo 
dat ideal as closely as possible, understanding that pragmatism concerns 
do in fact make some exceptions necessary while also appreciating that 
we should find ways to minimize the need for invoking such exceptions 
and reduce the need to rely on such second-best solutions to dirty deeds.  
Without changing criteria for the exceptions, we can change the access to 
information and the speed of its flow to shrink the pool of those who fit 
the criteria for the bona fide purchaser exception.  This would not be 
done by changing the nature of the protections available to innocent bona 
fide purchasers but instead by finding new ways to inject more 
information about land conveyances into the public view—beyond 
traditional recording mechanisms—so that more and earlier notice of 
possible competing property claims is available to responsible purchasers 
exercising due diligence. 
To accomplish that goal, this Article concludes in Part V with one 
proposal that aims to take advantage of what I call the underexploited 
utility of “inquiry notice.”  The idea is to create better conditions to give 
first-in-time purchasers additional opportunities to protect their title 
interests by more easily triggering the inquiry obligations of second-in-
time and other subsequent purchasers.  This Article outlines the 
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components of a proposed new and innovative service that I call the 
“Title-Related Inquiry Notice Triggering System” (TINTS).  As outlined, 
TINTS would operate in a manner that would provide a means for 
purchasers of property to protect their claim to title even earlier than 
official recording might accommodate.  Taking advantage of modern 
technology with near-instantaneous uploading of information into the 
publicly available TINTS, purchasers can notify the world of the 
existence of their claim to a particular piece of property immediately 
upon the completion of a conveyance from the grantor.  Through the 
development of custom, or perhaps by statutory mandate, it could 
become common practice for all purchasers to also access TINTS and 
search for potentially competing claims to the same property. 
Part V acknowledges potential risks of abuse in such a system like 
TINTS that could themselves have market-disrupting effects.  It offers 
some starting suggestions for controls against such risks, while 
explaining the market-facilitating benefits from a system like TINTS.  In 
the end, we should find ways to strengthen the law’s ability to make and 
defend the claim more frequently that one truly cannot sell what they 
have previously sold.  TINTS, or other innovations like it, can assist us in 
matching these nemo dat preferences with property law pragmatism.  
Maximizing the consonance of outcomes in real world title contests with 
the nemo dat ideal should be a goal of the property system. 
II.  A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE NEMO DAT PRINCIPLE AND ITS 
PLACE IN REAL PROPERTY LAW 
As stated at the top of this Article, the Latin maxim nemo dat quod 
non habet—one cannot give what they do not have (or, you have to have 
it to give it)
4
—holds a special place in our law.  The nemo dat principle 
is so strong that it has broad applications associated with the transfer of 
most assets, not just real property.
5
 
                                                          
 4.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1933 (10th ed. 2014) (“No one gives what he does not 
have . . . .”); Kevin E. Davis, The Effects of Forfeiture on Third Parties, 48 MCGILL L.J. 183, 196–
97 (2003) (articulating the “common law rule of nemo dat quod non habet (‘he who hath not cannot 
give’)”). 
 5.  See, e.g., Stephen T. Black, Psst! Wanna Buy a Bridge? IP Transfers of Non-Existent 
Property, 31 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 523, 529–30 (2015) (discussing the broader applications of nemo 
dat-like norms); Adam J. Levitin, Finding Nemo: Rediscovering the Virtues of Negotiability in the 
Wake of Enron, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 83, 90 (2007) [hereinafter Levitin, Finding Nemo] 
(defining “the commercial law principle of nemo dat quod non habet—you can transfer only what 
you have”) (emphasis added); Carl S. Bjerre, Secured Transactions Inside Out: Negative Pledge 
Covenants, Property and Perfection, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 333 (1999) (“[I]f the owner grants a 
security interest to one lender, the nemo dat principle standing alone would dictate that the owner 
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We should strive for the nemo dat ideal.  It is principled, in line with 
respect for autonomy and the promotion of individualism, better situated 
within rule of law concepts and the limits of individual authority, 
rewards honesty, protects the integrity of the legal system, promotes the 
legitimacy of the system, and prevents bad actors and fraud (including 
preventing such actors’ unjust enrichments).  The principle preserves the 
sanctity of ownership, and it minimizes the effectiveness of dirty deeds 
perpetrated through fraudulent, scoundrelous, or predatory behavior.
6
  
We feel more secure in our property holdings if we believe that no one 
can take them away.
7
 
Frankly, and perhaps most importantly, applying nemo dat makes 
true the rewards due to those who are first in time.  A strong nemo dat 
regime effectuated by more information making its way into the system 
protects first-in-time purchasers who gave good and valuable 
consideration to purchase the property and who thought that by doing so 
they could “own” it thereafter in exclusion of all others.  We should find 
a way to make those deals stick when we can.  The proposal at the end of 
this Article seeks to find one way that the law can aim to meet that 
charge with innovative experimentation with new ways to strengthen the 
network of information available to all players in the property title 
system so that deviations from nemo dat might be minimized. 
Nemo dat makes sense,
8
 and the strength of our intuitions regarding 
nemo dat explains why many are so flummoxed when you inform them 
that a person can sell you a piece of property today that yesterday he sold 
to your neighbor.
9
  It seems counterintuitive, as if it violates basic 
principles we learned as far back as kindergarten regarding scarcity and 
                                                          
may not thereafter grant a security interest of the same or greater priority to a later lender.”) 
(emphasis added); Adam J. Levitin, The Paper Chase: Securitization, Foreclosure, and the 
Uncertainty of Mortgage Title, 63 DUKE L.J. 637, 700 (2013) [hereinafter Levitin, The Paper Chase] 
(“Under the basic commercial-law rule of nemo dat, a transferor cannot transfer rights it does not 
have; I cannot sell you the Brooklyn Bridge.”) (emphasis added). 
 6.  See McFarlane, supra note 3, at 885 (identifying those who engage in conveying property 
twice as “predators”). 
 7.  Thomas E. Plank, Article 9 of the UCC: Reconciling Fundamental Property Principles and 
Plain Language, 68 BUS. LAW. 439, 441–42 (2013) (“[T]he principle that one cannot transfer an 
interest in property that the transferor does not have . . . .  [P]romotes the security of property.”); see 
also Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., U.C.C. Article 9, Filing-Based Priority, and 
Fundamental Property Principles: A Reply to Professor Plank, 69 BUS. LAW. 79, 80–81, 87–88 
(2013) (discussing nemo dat). 
 8.  Bjerre, supra note 5, at 333 (“The principle has strongly intuitive justificatory force; even 
children understand the power of the righteous claim, ‘I had it first!’”). 
 9.  Ralph W. Aigler, The Operation of the Recording Acts, 22 MICH. L. REV. 405, 416 (1924) 
(discussing how it baffles some that the grantor (or a grantor’s heir) retains “a power to defeat the 
unrecorded deed” that he himself granted). 




Do the exceptions to nemo dat also make sense?  To a degree, I think 
the answer is a clear yes.  But those exceptions require more explanation, 
especially because they must overcome this intuitive, common sense 
belief
11
 that no one should be able to sell the same thing twice.  The 
application of nemo dat, however, cannot in modern law be divorced 
from the necessity of standards for setting priorities between multiple 




The next Part will give readers the background necessary to 
understand how the law has come to develop these recording and title 
priority rules.  The rules discussed are normally just referred to as basic 
rules of recording real property interests.  Yet these rules take on a new 
meaning and understanding if they are framed as exceptions to, and 
pragmatic tools for the management of, the nemo dat principle and as 
considered deviations away from the nemo dat preference. 
III.  BACKGROUND: BASIC TERMINOLOGY AND DOCTRINE FOR 
RECORDING ACTS AND NOTICE MECHANISMS 
Before reaching the heart of this Article’s assessment of the reasons 
to adhere to a nemo dat principle and the reasons for its exceptions, this 
Part will provide some basic terminological and doctrinal background to 
orient the reader to the various types of recording statutory regimes and 
how they operate.  Most of the discussion regarding why these systems 
operate as they do and the purposes of recording will be saved for later 
Parts in this Article.  For now, the purpose will be to make sure all 
readers have a basic understanding of the recording system and the types 
of notice recognized by the law within that system. 
                                                          
 10.  Cf. generally ROBERT FULGHUM, ALL I REALLY NEED TO KNOW I LEARNED IN 
KINDERGARTEN 6 (1988) (“Don’t take things that aren’t yours.”). 
 11.  Henry E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2097, 2120 
(2012) (stating that the nemo dat principle “sounds like common sense, and it is”). 
 12.  Davis, supra note 4, at 196 n.67 (“[N]emo dat rule is merely a priority rule . . . .”); see also 
Levinz v. Will, 1 Dall. 430, 433–34 (Pa. 1789) (evaluating early act requiring recording of mortgage 
within six months in order to be effective against mortgagor and discussing the fact that “in the case 
of an innocent purchasor without notice of a previous conveyance . . . there may be circumstances 
which place him in a more favorable point of view” and explaining that recording statutes reflect that 
concern). 
8 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 64 
A.  Types of Recording Statutes 
When two or more individuals make claim to the same piece of 
property, rules must be established to resolve these competing claims.  
The following sections will evaluate four basic types of jurisdictional 
approaches to this problem: (1) no recording statute and instead where 
common law principles of first-in-time prevail; (2) “race” recording 
statutes; (3) “notice” recording statutes; and (4) “race-notice” statutes.
13
  
In each of these cases, we are concerned with a competing claimant other 
than the grantor, i.e. two different purchaser-grantees.  Because a grantor 
and grantee are parties to their own conveyance, their respective rights 
vis-à-vis each other will be judged by the terms of the conveyance.  
Resolution of competing claims between those parties will be resolved 
based on the documents and circumstances surrounding their transaction 
rather than on the recording rules of the jurisdiction.  An unrecorded 
deed is still valid and binding as between those parties to a conveyance 
of the property (and does so even in the face of statutory language that 
appears to claim only recorded deeds are “valid” because, under those 
statutes, the validity is being judged only with regard to subsequent 
purchasers).
14
  This Article’s major concern lies outside that initial 
relationship and instead focuses most of its attention on disputes between 
multiple purchasers claiming to hold title to the same property. 
Today, all states have some type of recording act and none rely on 
common law rules alone for the priorities between successive 
purchasers.
15
  Very few states use pure race rules,
16
 while the remainder 
                                                          
 13.  On each of the types of recording regimes, including first-in-time and no recording act, see 
JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY § 11.4.5.2 (3d ed. 2010); 1 JOYCE PALOMAR, PATTON AND 
PALOMAR ON LAND TITLES § 5 (3d ed. 2003) (dedicating treatise section to comparing recording 
acts); see also John H. Scheid, Down Labyrinthine Ways: A Recording Acts Guide for First Year 
Law Students, 80 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 91, 106–10 (2002) (describing the basics of the recording 
acts and notice requirements and rules); Michael Palestina, Comment, Of Registry: Louisiana’s 
Revised Public Records Doctrine, 53 LOY. L. REV. 989, 1000–02 (2007) (describing the recording 
systems and notice requirements).  
 14.  See 5 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1262 (3d ed. 1939 
& Supp. 2004) (failing to record only affects subsequent purchaser and “a failure to record the 
instrument in no way affects the passing of title as between the parties thereto” even when a statute 
“provides that a deed of real property shall not be valid for purpose of passing title unless it is 
acknowledged and recorded as directed by the statute”). 
 15.  See Charles Szypszak, Real Estate Records, The Captive Public, and Opportunities for the 
Public Good, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 5, 24 (2007–2008) [hereinafter Szypszak, Real Estate Records] 
(“All states have . . . laws that govern the effect of recording . . . .”). 
 16.  See SINGER, supra note 13, § 11.4.5.2, at 541 n.308.  See also Szypszak, Real Estate 
Records, supra note 15, at 26 (stating only three states have pure race statutes). 
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are about equally mixed between notice and race-notice rules.
17
  The 
following sections will highlight the differences between the recording 
regimes, but as these and later sections reveal, the jurisdictional 
interpretation and application of recording rules are more uniform (at 
least across the notice and race-notice jurisdictions) than they may 




1.  No Recording Statute/Common Law 
Under the common law, priority was dealt with through the simple 
application of first in time, first in right.
19
  So, before recording acts 
displaced the common law priority rules, disputes between two claimants 
to title at common law were resolved by simple first-in-time rules and 
“[i]f an owner purports to make two conveyances of the same land, the 
earlier one will prevail . . . .”
20
  The second purchaser, even if they had 
no notice of the prior claim,
21
 loses and at best can sue the grantor under 
warranties or perhaps for fraud.
22
 
In this sense, the protection of the first-in-time claimant and the 
refusal to give effect to a subsequent conveyance of the same property 
comported with the nemo dat ideal.  While a grantor may try to sell the 
                                                          
 17.  JERRY L. ANDERSON & DANIEL B. BOGART, PROPERTY LAW: PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND 
PERSPECTIVES 541 (2014) (discussing the distribution of recording statute types); Emily Bayer-
Pacht, Note, The Computerization of Land Records: How Advances in Recording Systems Affect the 
Rationale Behind Some Existing Chain of Title Doctrine, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 337, 344 n.50 (2010) 
(“Approximately half of the states now have notice statutes and the other half have race-notice 
statutes.”). 
 18.  See 1 PALOMAR, supra note 13, § 5 (“[R]ecording acts of the several states show a general 
uniformity, in spite of differences in phraseology. . . . [J]udicial decisions have a greater uniformity 
than the acts themselves and indicate that the differences in the acts are more apparent than real.”); 
Gerald Korngold, Resolving the Intergenerational Conflicts of Real Property Law: Preserving Free 
Markets and Personal Autonomy for Future Generations, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1525, 1564 (2007) 
[hereinafter Korngold, Resolving] (“While the recording acts differ among the states in some 
respects, they share many common models, attributes, and goals.”); Szypszak, Real Estate Records, 
supra note 15, at 24 (“Most of the states’ [recording] laws share the same essential features, which 
take into account both the order of recording and any notice a claimant may have had about a prior, 
competing conveyance.”). 
 19.  John W. Fisher, II, The Scope of Title Examination in West Virginia: Can Reasonable 
Minds Differ?, 98 W. VA. L. REV. 449, 453 (1996) (describing first-in-time principles to resolve 
conflicting claims to land “in feudal England, [when] there were no recording laws”). 
 20.  See SINGER, supra note 13, § 11.4.5, at 541. 
 21.  Sue Ortman, Comment, USLTA: Marketable Record Title Act—A New Title Theory and Its 
Effect on Texas Law, 12 ST. MARY’S L.J. 462, 465 (1980) (“The common law doctrine of ‘first in 
time, first in right’ encouraged fraudulent conveyances of real property and worked a hardship on 
subsequent purchasers unaware of the earlier conflicting interest.”). 
 22.  See id. 
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same property twice and commit fraud, such second sale will not have 
legal effect and will not subordinate the first purchaser’s rights to the 
property. 
It is precisely the possibility of fraud and the way it was encouraged 
under these common law rules—because there was no definitive records 
office to verify claims, requiring multiple claimants to expend money 
proving their case for priority based on developing an evidentiary record 
that they were first in time—that led to substantial criticism of the system 
and motivated the adoption of recording laws as providing more effective 
verifiability systems.
23
  Without recording provisions and effect given to 
the act of recording, individuals were easily duped into buying property 
that had already been sold to another because there was no way to check 
and verify the existence or non-existence of competing claims.  The 




Recording helps provide evidence of a superior claim to the world, 
or at least helps define the meaning of “superior” in a manner 
accompanied with mechanisms to verify that priority.  Recording is the 
method by which modern purchasers vaunt their claim to newly 
conveyed property and serve public notice, which takes the place of less 
transparent and verifiable means of proof.
25
 
With the passage of recording acts, the states have replaced the 
common law priority rules with laws that require either some step 
beyond conveyance or, at the very least, an additional metric of notice to 
come into play before determining which grantee receives priority in a 
title contest.
26
  In other words, in every state in the United States, it is 
now usually no longer enough to simply be the first party to be conveyed 
property in order to win in a title contest.
27
  Of course, in those situations 
where recording acts exist but no claimants (original or subsequent) take 
advantage of them—i.e. when neither party can fit into the safe harbor 
that a recording system typically provides—the parties are defaulted 
                                                          
 23.  Id. at 463 (“To meet the needs of today’s urban, highly mobile society, a land transfer 
system must provide for simple, secure, and inexpensive transfers.”). 
 24.  Charles Szypszak, North Carolina’s Real Estate Recording Laws: The Ghost of 1885, 28 
N.C. CENT. L.J. 199, 200 (2006) [hereinafter Szypszak, North Carolina] (stating recording laws 
work to protect purchasers against “undetectable competing claims”). 
 25.  See 1 PALOMAR, supra note 13, § 17 (“The record of a deed today serves the same function 
of public notice as did livery of seisin and the delivery of a twig, clod or key in former times.”). 
 26.  See 5 TIFFANY, supra note 14, § 1262 (describing how recording acts preempt prior first-
in-time common law rules). 
 27.  See Szypszak, Real Estate Records, supra note 15, at 24 (describing the resolution of 
conflicting claims under no recording statute and then under each of the existing recording regimes). 
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back into a first-in-time resolution of a title dispute. 
Without a recording system, a purchaser would be entirely dependent 
on the assurances of the vendor of the property—a situation that is rife 
with the potential for abuse.
28
  After all, what incentive would there be 
for a vendor to disclose the existence of prior competing interests?  The 
recording system seeks to provide an institutional correction and a 
market-enhancing mechanism to defeat those temptations to commit such 
dirty deeds.  A primary purpose of recording is to create official public 
records that protect buyers “against any competing claims that may be 
created by the grantor in others”
29
 and to influence the behavior of 
owners (and their lawyers and other representatives) in a way that 
motivates the creation and transaction of title that is as clean as possible. 
The next subsections outline the three jurisdictional models adopted 
in various states.  Through application of each of these recording acts in 
their own way, it can be said that particular individuals will “win” in 
some contests based on operational exceptions to the nemo dat principle.  
All of the recording acts at least diminish the nemo dat principle’s power 
as a controlling influence in title disputes. 
2. Race Jurisdictions 
In the very few jurisdictions that have chosen to operate under a 
“race” statute, the idea is simple: when there are two competing 
successive purchasers of a particular piece of property, the first to record 
his interest is awarded the property because he has won the race to the 
recording office.
30
  To see how a race statute is typically worded, 
consider the following language from the recording laws of North 
Carolina: 
§ 47-18. Conveyances, contracts to convey, options and leases of land 
                                                          
 28.  The U.S. Supreme Court explained these perverse incentives in its Neslin v. Wells opinion: 
To hold otherwise would be to declare that land should cease generally to be the subject 
of sale; for no amount of diligence on the part of a purchaser would insure his title.  He 
would, of course, demand of the vender an inspection of his title-deeds.  From them he 
would learn the chain of title.  A production and examination of the deeds made in the 
common form would show by their recitals that none of the preceding owners could have 
any claim for unpaid purchase-money, for the receipt of it, in each instance, is usually 
contained in the deed.  He would, therefore, reasonably deem it unnecessary to make any 
personal inquiry, and in respect to supposed incumbrances in favor of strangers he would 
be compelled to rely upon the statements of the vendor. 
Neslin v. Wells, 104 U.S. 428, 436 (1881). 
 29.  SINGER, supra note 13, § 11.4.5.1, at 538. 
 30.  See Szypszak, Real Estate Records, supra note 15, at 24–25. 
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(a) No (i) conveyance of land, or (ii) contract to convey, or (iii) option 
to convey, or (iv) lease of land for more than three years shall be valid 
to pass any property interest as against lien creditors or purchasers for a 
valuable consideration from the donor, bargainor or lessor but from the 
time of registration thereof in the county where the land lies, or if the 
land is located in more than one county, then in each county where any 
portion of the land lies to be effective as to the land in that county.  
Unless otherwise stated either on the registered instrument or on a 
separate registered instrument duly executed by the party whose 
priority interest is adversely affected, (i) instruments registered in the 
office of the register of deeds shall have priority based on the order of 
registration as determined by the time of registration, and (ii) if 
instruments are registered simultaneously, then the instruments shall be 
presumed to have priority as determined by: 
(1) The earliest document number set forth on the registered instrument. 
(2) The sequential book and page number set forth on the registered 
instrument if no document number is set forth on the registered 
instrument. 
The presumption created by this subsection is rebuttable.
31
 
Race jurisdictions can be characterized as  “survival of the fastest” 
regimes, where the party first to the courthouse survives in his claim 
regardless of the quality of the claim itself at least vis-à-vis other 
claimants.  Some paint race jurisdictions in a positive light, highlighting 
that the legislative choice made under such laws fosters much-valued 
greater certainty.
32
  One could also make a claim that race statutes reward 
those with the greatest demonstration of individual responsibility, 
coupled with competitive edge by laboring harder, faster, and in 
accordance with the established rules of the game to reach the recording 
office first. 
In pure race jurisdictions,
33
 it is a matter of priority by record alone.  
Certainty and efficiency—combined with a judgment that those who 
protect their interests most speedily and diligently, contributing to the 
completeness of information in the records—set the policy in such 
jurisdictions.  In contrast, equitable concerns over protecting subsequent 
                                                          
 31.  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-18(a) (West 2013). 
 32.  See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Humphries, 496 S.E.2d 563, 566 (N.C. 1998) (“The purpose 
of these laws is to provide certainty in real estate transactions, for the benefit of purchasers and 
lenders.”). 
 33.  Race jurisdictions are often termed “pure race” jurisdictions so as not to be confused with 
race-notice jurisdictions.  See Szypszak, Real Estate Records, supra note 15, at 24–25. 
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purchasers without notice are valued less in pure race jurisdictions.
34
  
Neither time of conveyance nor whether either party had notice of the 
other party matters in a pure race jurisdiction.
35
  Thus, even a second 
purchaser who knows of the first purchaser can prevail.
36
  For this 
reason, some see pure race as unfair, explaining also the popularity of the 
other two regimes: notice and race-notice.
37
  In contrast to pure race 
regimes, the idea behind notice and race-notice alternatives is to protect 
bona fide purchasers who take from grantors and, by no fault of their 
own, have no idea that another party has been previously sold the 
property.
38
  On the other side of the coin, another related purpose is to 
avoid rewarding later purchasers who know the grantor has already sold 
the same property to someone else.
39
  In other words, these other models 
protect a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice—someone 
who has no reason to question the authority of his grantor to sell the 
property in question
40
—while race is indifferent to such a complexion. 
The recording laws have developed in most jurisdictions under 
models that care about such purchaser characteristics.
41
  With slight 
variation between them, these two notice-based models shield those later 
purchasers who have an honest belief in the legitimacy of the real 
property transaction to which they become a party,
42
 as the next two 
subsections detail in turn. 
                                                          
 34.  See, e.g., ANDERSON & BOGART, supra note 17, at 542 (“[R]ace statutes value certainty 
over fairness,” promoting the idea that by “fair” we mean protecting subsequent purchasers without 
notice).  
 35.  See id. at 542–43. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  SINGER, supra note 13, § 11.4.5.2, at 542 (discussing the inequities in race statute regimes 
where it allows “later buyers to prevail over earlier buyers when they know about the earlier 
conveyance” that notice and race-notice attempt to correct). 
 38.  See Hutchinson v. Harttmann, 15 Kan. 133, 141 (1875) (defining bona fide purchaser); 
Cunningham v. Norwegian Lutheran Church of Am., 184 P.2d 834, 836–37 (Wash. 1947) 
(upholding basic protections for bona fide purchasers) (citing Kroetch v. Hinnenkamp, 18 P.2d 491, 
492 (Wash. 1933)). 
 39.  See Szypszak, Real Estate Records, supra note 15, at 25. 
 40.  Chad J. Pomeroy, Ending Surprise Liens on Real Property, 11 NEV. L.J. 139, 142 n.12 
(2010) (describing the broad meaning of “bona fide purchaser for value” as “derivative of the 
common law concept of one who gains an interest in property for fair value and in good faith 
believing the seller possessed full rights to the transferred property interest”). 
 41.  See Szypszak, Real Estate Records, supra note 15, at 24–25. 
 42.  Beach v. Faust, 40 P.2d 822, 823 (Cal. 1935) (“The recording laws[‘] . . . purpose is to 
protect those who honestly believe they are acquiring a good title, and who invest some substantial 
sum in reliance on that belief.”). 
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3. Notice Jurisdictions 
Pure notice jurisdictions
43
 focus on just that—notice.
44
  In a pure 
notice jurisdiction, a subsequent purchaser who takes a property without 
notice of the prior claimant will win, in essence, invalidating or 
subordinating the rights of the prior grantee.
45
  Some phrase the notice 
jurisdiction rules as meaning this result occurs regardless of who records 
first, and that phrasing has some merit.
46
  But, while that may be 
technically true, it is always the case that if the first grantee records 
before the conveyance to the subsequent grantee, then the subsequent 
grantee will be on record notice of the prior grantee and will not be in a 
position to invalidate the prior grantee’s claim.
47
  In other words, if the 
subsequent grantee has notice—record or otherwise—of the earlier 
conveyance then that subsequent grantee cannot take priority. 
A typical notice jurisdiction will have language in its recording act 
similar to that used in Kansas: “No such instrument [conveying or 
affecting real estate] in writing shall be valid, except between the parties 
thereto, and such as have actual notice thereof, until the same shall be 
deposited with the register of deeds for record.”
48
  Recording itself 
ensures that all parties will have notice of the pre-existing claim and 
cannot claim to be without notice.
49
  But until title is recorded, so long as 
a subsequent purchaser is without “actual notice” (which is a term that 
Kansas and other jurisdictions have generally interpreted quite broadly to 
include actual, implied, constructive, record, and inquiry notice
50
) of the 
                                                          
 43.  Notice jurisdictions are sometimes referred to as “pure notice” jurisdictions so as not to be 
confused with race-notice jurisdictions.  See Szypszak, Real Estate Records, supra note 15, at 28. 
 44.  See id. at 27. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  See id. at 26–27 (explaining notice jurisdiction rules). 
 47.  See infra Part III.B. 
 48.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2223 (2008).  This section is titled “[Recordation of instruments 
conveying or affecting real estate]; unrecorded instrument valid only between parties having actual 
notice.”  See also MO. REV. STAT. § 442.400 (2000) (“No such instrument in writing shall be valid, 
except between the parties thereto, and such as have actual notice thereof, until the same shall be 
deposited with the recorder for record.”).  It should be noted that the word “deposited” here 
identifies the point of legal effectiveness for certain purposes but not all.  See infra Part V.  This is 
because subsequent purchasers sometimes will not be charged with knowledge of the recording until 
it is both deposited and thereafter indexed and recorded in a manner that makes the deed capable of 
being found through a diligent search of the records in the records office.  Id.  Cases dealing with 
delays and misindexing often raise complex, fact-specific issues and differential treatment across 
jurisdictions that are beyond the scope of this Article.  
 49.  See infra Part III.B. 
 50.  See, e.g., Faris v. Finnup, 113 P. 407, 408 (Kan. 1911) (“Actual notice may be either 
express or implied; that is, it may consist of knowledge actually brought personally home, or it may 
consist of knowledge of facts so informing that a reasonably cautious person would be led by them 
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previous conveyance, then that conveyance is not valid to enforce against 
that subsequent purchaser and the subsequent purchaser wins because he 
is a bona fide purchaser without notice.
51
 
If, however, the subsequent purchaser has notice of the previous 
conveyance, then the import of the language is that the prior conveyance 
will be valid for the earlier grantee to assert against the subsequent 
grantee to defeat the later-in-time conveyance in a contest for ownership 
of the property.  Note again, however, that even though the first grantee 
is not required to record first in order to prevail in such a contest with a 
subsequent purchaser, it is absolutely prudent that the first purchaser 
records even in a pure notice jurisdiction.  This is because, by doing so, 
he effects notice on the entire world, including the full pool of potential 
subsequent purchasers, thereby defeating all claims by subsequent 
purchasers who then cannot be eligible for the label of “bona fide” once 
record notice exists.  It is precisely this reality that makes notice 
jurisdictions usually indistinguishable operationally from race-notice 
jurisdictions, because in the vast majority of cases the first purchaser in 
notice jurisdictions will also be both a purchaser without notice of 
competing claims and the first to record. 
4. Race-Notice Jurisdictions 
Race-notice jurisdictions seek to combine the best of both race and 
notice jurisdictions to achieve an efficient and predictable, yet also fair, 
result.
52
  Under a race-notice regime, a subsequent purchaser faces a 
tough set of hurdles.  A subsequent purchaser can only get priority status 
over prior grantees if he both (1) takes his conveyance without notice of 
the other claimants and (2) is the first to record his claim.
53
  Even after 
                                                          
to the ultimate fact.”). 
 51.  Nuckles v. Tallman, 187 P. 654, 655 (Kan. 1920) (explaining unrecorded deeds under 
Kansas statutes are valid between the parties to that deed, to those with actual notice of the deed, and 
otherwise “to be given full force, except as against the claims of innocent purchasers for value, or 
persons having equities of substantially equal strength”). 
 52.  ANDERSON & BOGART, supra note 17, at 546 (explaining race-notice statutes “combine the 
critical elements” of race and notice approaches); SINGER, supra note 13, § 11.4.5.2, at 543–44 
(“Race-notice laws represent a compromise between the predictability of race statutes and the 
fairness of protecting only those who buy without notice of the prior claim.”). 
 53.  Szypszak, Real Estate Records, supra note 15, at 27; 5 TIFFANY, supra note 14, § 1258 
(describing the favored status of legal title as actual owner over holder of a mere equitable title 
interest); Schwalm v. Deanhardt, 906 P.2d 167, 169–70 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).  “Actual notice” in 
Kansas is express or implied and includes those things to which “a reasonably cautious person would 
be prompted to further inquiry, which further inquiry would inform him of the outstanding 
unrecorded conveyance.”  Id. (citing Lane v. Courange, 359 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Kan. 1961)).  
“[A]ctual notice includes knowledge of circumstances to enable reasonably prudent persons to 
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the property is sold to a second purchaser without notice, the first 
purchaser (so long as he also had no notice of competing claims at the 
time of his purchase (which is subsumed if he is truly “first”)) still has a 
window to perfect his claim to title by recording before (and winning the 
race with) the subsequent purchaser.
54
 
California’s recording statute provides a good example of terms used 
to create a race-notice system: 
Every conveyance of real property or an estate for years therein, other 
than a lease for a term not exceeding one year, is void as against any 
subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of the same property, or any part 
thereof, in good faith and for a valuable consideration, whose 
conveyance is first duly recorded, and as against any judgment 
affecting the title, unless the conveyance shall have been duly recorded 
prior to the record of notice of action.
55
 
In essence, race-notice jurisdictions protect those that are first to file 
so long as they are without notice of prior purchasers.
56
 
Consider the following example application.  If the subsequent 
purchaser D takes without notice on Tuesday, then the earlier purchaser 
C (who was also without notice of competing claims) records on 
Wednesday, then the subsequent purchaser D records on Thursday, the 
result is that the subsequent purchaser D is too late in a race-notice 
jurisdiction.  Despite his “innocence”—i.e. lack of knowledge or notice 
of the earlier claimant—D was not quick enough, and D loses.  Note that 
in a pure notice jurisdiction, however, D would have won under the 
above facts (because he took without notice, including without record 
notice because at the time D purchased C still had not yet recorded).  In 
order for D to win in the facts above, he would have needed to record 
sometime before C. 
* * * 
As mentioned above, despite variations in the language of some 
                                                          
investigate and ascertain the ultimate facts.”  Id. at 170. 
 54.  See William A. Reppy, Jr., Some Issues Raised by Alaska’s Recording Act, 27 ALASKA L. 
REV. 195, 198 (2010).  Professor Reppy explains it this way: 
Under a Notice-type statute, as soon as the second-in-time deed is delivered to a bona 
fide purchaser, the prior grantee who had yet to record is divested of his or her title that 
conflicts with the grant to the subsequent purchaser.  But under a Race-Notice statute, 
title remains in the first grantee until the subsequent bona fide purchaser records.  Thus, 
the prior grantee is only divested if the subsequent purchaser actually records. 
Id. at 197. 
 55.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1214 (West 2007).  The title of this section is “Prior recording of 
subsequent conveyances, mortgages, judgments.” 
 56.  Id. 
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recording statutes, they (except for race jurisdictions) “almost 
invariably . . . have received the same construction, as affording 
protection to a subsequent purchaser only when he is without notice of 
the unrecorded conveyance.”
57
  Under all of these variations on 
establishing priority, if a first-in-time purchaser acts responsibly and 
records, most often he will be protected.
58
  Of course prudence dictates 
that one should immediately record, yet that may not be enough 
protection in every case.  There may be gaps between the filing of a 
record and its effectiveness in the recording office that must be addressed 
and these are some of the concerns addressed later in this Article.
59
 
Nonetheless, the vast majority of interests can be protected against 
adverse claims by prompt recording no matter what jurisdictional rules 
apply—whether it is to win the race, to use the recording to provide 
notice, or to both provide notice and beat others (who are without notice) 
in a race to the perfection of one’s title.  Once the first grantee files and 
creates record notice, he is protected against subsequent purchasers under 
both notice and race-notice regimes because all others will be put on 
notice of the competing claim
60
 and therefore will be unable to meet the 
standards to be an eligible bona fide purchaser without notice
61
 (and, 
consequently, will usually lose in a contest with a prior title claimant
62
). 
Once title is recorded, the prior owner’s ability to successfully carry 
out a fraudulent re-conveyance without exposure and liability is severely 
diminished.  This fraud-deterrence function is at least one rationale 
underlying the development of recording laws and bona fide purchaser 
protections.
63
  The process of recording should capture and prevent most 
multiple sales from subordinating the first-in-time purchaser.
64
  
Nonetheless—whether it is because of errors in recording, gaps in 
                                                          
 57.  5 TIFFANY, supra note 14, § 1283. 
 58.  See id. 
 59.  See infra Part V. 
 60.  Neslin v. Wells, 104 U.S. 428, 433 (1881) (“It is a mere corollary from this datum that 
these records are, by construction of law, notice to all persons of what they contain.”). 
 61.  Poplin v. Mundell, 27 Kan. 138, 156 (Kan. 1882) (acknowledging effects of record notice 
on subsequent purchasers). 
 62.  See Dan S. Schechter, Judicial Lien Creditors Versus Prior Unrecorded Transferees of 
Real Property: Rethinking the Goals of the Recording System and Their Consequences, 62 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 105, 116–17 (1988) (discussing relative cost avoidance and explaining that when we assume 
that a subsequent purchaser had “notice of the prior unrecorded interest, it follows that he could have 
avoided the problem” by informing himself and thereafter refusing to purchase “but failed to do so”). 
 63.  Id. at 112 (“[T]he fraud deterrence rationale partly explains why relying classes of 
subsequent transferees would be protected, while the certainty rationale partly explains why some 
unrecorded transfers not involving fraud are nevertheless invalidated.”). 
 64.  See id. at 118. 
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recording time, failure of purchasers to know that it is necessary and 
prudent to record, or other failure—subsequent purchaser subordination 
of prior title claimants is a real phenomenon.
65
  That means that 
exceptions to nemo dat are not simply theoretical but instead exist and 
operate, in fact, to empower the passing of dirty deeds. 
Similarly, if you act responsibly and do your due diligence as a 
purchaser, becoming informed of any potential adverse claims and 
finding none, then in most cases, you will be protected by the shelter 
provided to bona fide purchasers without notice.  If you find an adverse 
claim, then you will most likely breathe a sigh of relief as you avoided 
purchasing an encumbered title.  A purchaser who fails to check the 
records before buying land, though, acts negligently and has no 
excuse
66
—he is charged with knowledge of all things contained and 
discoverable in the property records.
67
  Of course, depending on the 
jurisdiction, every purchaser who thinks he could potentially be a 
subsequent purchaser (a fear that every purchaser should force himself to 
have) may need to record promptly as well to get that recording law 
protection.  No matter what your position in the sequence or what 
recording model applies, one cannot escape the reality that thorough title 
history homework and prompt title recording are both necessities in any 
land acquisition. 
Legislatures set the recording rules for society to follow and within 
those statutes provide means for all parties to protect themselves.  The 
recording statutes set standards by which courts can interpret obligations 
and compliance with such rules to decide between competing claimants 
to title.  Once the rules are set, it is the individual’s responsibility to 
understand the legal system and operate within it, including, for example, 
for a purchaser to understand that recording is essentially a duty; but 
certainly, at the very least, a purchaser must understand that recording is 
a prerequisite to receiving the full protection of the law. 
Of course, notice is the key because even if a prior conveyance is 
unrecorded, a subsequent purchaser who actually knows about the prior 
conveyance or is given reason to inquire in a way that they would learn 
                                                          
 65.  Id. at 126. 
 66.  Bankers Trust Co. v. United States, 25 P.3d 877, 881 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (“‘[I]t is 
negligence for a purchaser of either real or personal property to make the purchase without 
ascertaining the facts shown by the records which may affect the title to be acquired.’” (quoting 
Kuhn v. Nat’l Bank of Holton, 87 P. 551, 552 (Kan. 1906))). 
 67.  Kuhn v. Nat’l Bank of Holton, 87 P. 551, 552 (Kan. 1906) (“[P]urchaser will be presumed 
to have bought with knowledge of all the facts which the records at the time would have disclosed.  
Equity cannot be invoked to relieve one from the consequences of his own negligence.” (citing 
Hargis v. Robinson, 66 P. 988, 988–89 (Kan. 1901))). 
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about it typically lacks the ability to “win” in a battle for the property 
over the prior grantee.
68
  Given how critical notice becomes to the 
operation of the recording system and the identification of priority 
between competing claims, this Part will close with some introductory 
background on the types of notice recognized by the law as defeating 
one’s ability to claim status as a subsequent bona fide purchaser. 
B. Background on Types of Notice 
If you know or should know that a grantor lacks or might lack the 
authority to sell you a piece of property, then you cannot claim to be 
innocent in the possible perpetuation of fraud by the grantor.
69
  It is a 
matter of equity, always (both before, after, and irrespective of any 
existing notice or race-notice recording acts), that one with notice of an 
adverse claim purchases without the good faith necessary to give that 
purchaser the legal status surrounding the term “bona fide purchaser.”
70
  
Although this status is more formally sometimes referred to as “bona fide 
purchaser for value” or “bona fide purchaser for value and without 
notice” or “bona fide purchaser without notice,” this Article will mainly 
use “bona fide purchaser” as shorthand for these longer terms that mean 
essentially: to be entitled to protection under notice and race-notice 
recording acts, the purchaser is one who buys the property, for a real, 
non-sham value, is not engaged in fraud, and has no notice that 
something is not quite right with the sale.
71
  This Article’s concern is 
principally on the “notice” aspect of this status, and this section will 
                                                          
 68.  See 5 TIFFANY, supra note 14, § 1285 (explaining in most states actual notice or 
information that will put one “on inquiry in regard to [a prior] conveyance” is “sufficient, in order to 
deprive a person of the right to claim as against a prior unrecorded conveyance”). 
 69.  See 1 PALOMAR, supra note 13, § 11 (noting that the phrase “innocent” purchaser is 
sometimes used as the equivalent of “bona fide” purchaser). 
 70.  It has always been the case that as an equitable matter one taking property with notice of an 
adverse and enforceable claim cannot claim to have the qualities of an innocent necessary to be a 
bona fide purchaser: 
[I]n the period prior to the enactment of recording statutes, rules originated for the 
determination of priorities. . . . Conflicting claims not covered by statute fall into three 
classifications, all covered by the general law rule that the first in time is first in right, re-
enforced by the equity maxim that equity follows the law. . . . [W]hen the earlier right is 
equitable, the courts allow it priority in the event only that the holder of the later legal 
interest acquired it with notice, or did not pay value for it; if the holder of the later legal 
claim is a purchaser for value without notice of the earlier equitable right or interest, the 
equitable doctrine of bona fide purchaser prevails and it is the later claim which is 
protected. 
4 THOMAS E. ATKINSON ET AL., AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.1, at 523–25 (A. James Casner 
ed., 1952). 
 71.  See 1 PALOMAR, supra note 13, § 11. 
20 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 64 
address the meaning of “notice.” 
Notice itself is a broad concept with a number of variations but each 
having the same essential effect.
72
  Notice may include actual knowledge 
of, or actual notice of, a fact.
73
  This means the purchaser not only had 
information available to him but he also knew of that information (e.g., 
he was told the fact, he read the fact in the records, etc.).
74
  Note that our 
protection through notice requirements is aimed at protecting a purchase, 
and thus what matters most is the quantum of notice available at the time 
the purchaser must pay consideration for the property.  Many courts hold 
that actual notice may be express or implied.
75
 
There is also the category of “record notice” (sometimes referred to 
simply as “constructive notice” even though it is only one of several 
types of “constructive” notice, as will be discussed in a moment) where 
the world is presumed to be on notice of all claims to title properly 
recorded and of any facts that may be included in the title, deed, and 
other documents filed in that record for a particular piece of property.
76
  
And, it is the responsibility of all purchasers to check the record before 
purchasing property, lest they risk losing to a prior titleholder of record. 
Some wonderful language on record notice exists to describe the 
benefits and purposes of recording in the 1881 U.S. Supreme Court 
opinion in Neslin v. Wells,
77
 which, surprisingly, turns out to be an 
inexplicably rarely cited opinion.  Neslin is a case involving claims of 
priority lien status by a claimed prior mortgagee of the same land to 
which another mortgagee made a claim.
78
  Because it is so instructive 
and has rarely received ink in legal commentary, it is worth quoting parts 
of that opinion at length. 
Faced with interpreting early Utah legislation that “did not require 
that a mortgage should be recorded in order to be valid, and did not in 
terms declare what should be the legal effect of recording or omitting to 
record it,”
79
 the Court needed to set forth some general principles of 
notice that it identified as broadly applicable regardless of the type of 
                                                          
 72.  Id. § 12 (defining various types of notice for recording statute purposes). 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  See, e.g., Faris v. Finnup, 113 P. 407, 408 (Kan. 1911) (“Actual notice may be either 
express or implied; that is, it may consist of knowledge actually brought personally home, or it may 
consist of knowledge of facts so informing that a reasonably cautious person would be led by them 
to the ultimate fact.”). 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  104 U.S. 428, 428 (1881). 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. at 432. 
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recording system in place.
80
  The Court reasoned that the existence of the 
recording system and the availability to record title there serves a 
purpose to which we also attach an obligation.
81
  Regarding real property 
recording systems, the Court’s message seemed clear—if society builds 
it, purchasers must come and inspect it before purchasing: 
The provisions of the law in reference to these records either have no 
purpose at all,—which we have no right to assume,—or their purpose 
was, that the public might have knowledge of the titles to real estate of 
which they are the registers.  It would utterly defeat that purpose not to 
presume with conclusive force that the notice which it was their office 
to communicate had reached the party interested to receive it; for, if 
every man was at liberty to say he had failed to acquire the knowledge 
it was important for him to have, because he had not taken the trouble 
to search the record which the law had provided for the express 
purpose of giving it to him, then the ignorance which it was the public 
interest and policy to prevent would become universal, and the law 
would fail because it refused to make itself respected.
82
 
Because “it is uniformly held that the registration of a conveyance 
operates as constructive notice to all subsequent purchasers of any estate, 
legal or equitable, in the same property,” and the “policy of the registry 
acts” requires that one do what he can to protect himself from taking 
property already granted to another, such recording acts therefore create 
“the duty of the purchaser under such circumstances to search for prior 
incumbrances, the means of which search are within his power.”
83
  
According to the Neslin Court—regardless of whether the legislative acts 
of a state mandate that a purchaser inspect such available records—
practice and habit certainly have developed to the point that the real 
estate industry accepts these as standard practices, and, consequently, 
these customs have ripened into duties.
84
 
                                                          
 80.  See id. 
 81.  Id. at 435. 
 82.  Id. at 433–34 (emphasis added). 
 83.  Id. at 434 (citing JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 402–03 
(Stevens & Haynes eds., 1st ed. 1884)). 
 84.  Id.  The Court explains this process of habit leading to custom then legal expectation as 
follows: 
It is a further inference which we are judicially bound to make, that records so carefully 
provided by law, and so useful, were in fact the common resort of the community whose 
dealings in real estate they were meant to register; that the practice of recording 
conveyances and incumbrances of the title to land, for the purposes of evidence and of 
information to those who might be affected by them, and the habit of searching the 
records in order to obtain that knowledge, was general and usual; that such practice and 
habit had become so common, that men of ordinary prudence in the management of 
important concerns affecting their own interests would expect to conform to it 
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Non-record notice may also exist to create actual notice or to trigger 
inquiry notice, as it is only fair to hold a purchaser responsible for 
accepting title “with notice” whenever he has any reason to know that 
there is a valid competing, prior claimant.
85
  Furthermore, constructive 
notice is a broad term and takes on a variety of meanings within and 
across jurisdictions.  It is mainly designed to capture those things that are 
available to provide actual notice—including records or other public 
documents that, with due diligence would have been discovered.
86
  For 
example, the existence of a fact in a record is actual notice if an 
individual actually reads it.  But if the individual never goes to the 
records office, then he does not have actual notice of record facts but 
instead is on constructive notice (or suffers the “record notice” subset of 
constructive notice) of those record facts.  Similarly, one may be charged 
with constructive notice of facts that he could have gained had he made 
certain inquiries after inquiry notice obligations were triggered
87
—i.e. he 
is on notice of the facts that exist that he should have discovered with 
due diligence, but when he does not actually take the steps necessary to 
actually discover the facts and thereby “know” them, then we say that 
individual is on constructive rather than actual notice of the facts. 
In addition to each of these categories discussed above, an extremely 
important and broad subcategory of notice law lies in “inquiry notice,”
88
 
where the existence of red flags that cause one to question whether there 
might be an adverse claim to a particular piece of property stalls the path 
to becoming a bona fide purchaser.
89
  It is important to note that inquiry 
                                                          
themselves, and would act upon the expectation that others of that character would do so 
likewise. 
Id. at 435. 
 85.  See Palestina, supra note 13, at 1029 (“Non-record notice is recognized almost universally 
in recording statu[t]es throughout the United States.  The reason for this is simple: it lends fairness 
and objective justice to the system.”). 
 86.  Miller v. Alexander, 775 P.2d 198, 202–04 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (defining scope of 
constructive notice under Kansas law). 
 87.  Inc. Trs. of Salvation Army in Pa. v. Lawson, 143 A. 113, 114 (Pa. 1928) (describing 
constructive notice as including “what they could have learned by inquiry of the person in 
possession and of others who, they had reason to believe, knew of facts which might affect the title,” 
including what was available in records offices). 
 88.  1 PALOMAR, supra note 13, § 12 (“Possession that is not explainable by the records is only 
one form of inquiry notice.  If other circumstances exist that ought to put a person exercising 
common reason and prudence on inquiry, a purchaser will be presumed to have made that inquiry 
and will be charged with notice of every fact that would have resulted from it.”). 
 89.  Roberts v. Estate of Pursley, 718 A.2d 837, 843 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (stating purchasers of 
real estate affected by actual notice and what could be discovered by inquiry upon “others, who they 
had reason to believe, knew of facts which might affect title” but “a purchaser will not be prejudiced 
by facts, which he could not have learned by inquiry”); see also Palestina, supra note 13, at 1030 
(“Inquiry notice can be described as a form of ‘red-flag’ notice . . . required to make a reasonably 
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notice rules tend to apply rather uniformly in cases with competing title 
claims regardless of the language of recording acts, precisely because 
inquiry notice rules are based on equitable principles that permeate the 
rules for the resolution of any such disputes.
90
 
Part V will return to inquiry notice as an underexploited opportunity 
for the realization of nemo dat-like outcomes.  For now, this subsection 
will end by explaining what is meant by the term “inquiry notice” and 
the legal consequences that attach to this category of notice. 
Inquiry notice is about taking extra steps to clear up title confusion.  
A purchaser may rely on the vendor’s warranties and matters in the 
record but if there are “clues” inside or outside the records that come to 
one’s attention, he may need to inquire further.
91
  As the Kansas 
Supreme Court explained it, for example, “[n]o purchaser of real estate is 
at liberty to remain intentionally ignorant of facts relating to his purchase 
within his reach,”
92
 so when one has reason to believe there may be more 
information to find—when the duty to inquire further is triggered—then 
he must reach out and start investigating.  A purchaser will be charged 
with knowledge of whatever information could have been gleaned after 
making an inquiry once it has been determined that some fact triggered 
the duty to inquire.
93
  This is true even when the prior purchaser is also at 
fault for not having recorded title, but the subsequent purchaser had 
reason to be suspicious of a competing prior claim and could have 
                                                          
prudent investigation to either dispel or confirm his suspicion.”). 
 90.  See 5 TIFFANY, supra note 14, § 1285 (finding inquiry notice is “a principle well settled in 
equity, without reference to the recording acts”). 
 91.  See Faris v. Finnup, 113 P. 407, 408 (Kan. 1911).  The Kansas Supreme Court has stated 
the relationship between trusting a vendor and asking further questions as follows: 
No claim of express notice to the appellee is made.  Actual notice is implied only when 
the known facts are sufficiently specific to impose the duty to investigate further and 
when such facts furnish a natural clue to the ultimate fact.  The appellee purchased upon 
a warranty of full title.  Consequently he was not put upon inquiry like one who accepts a 
quitclaim deed.  He could safely rely upon his vendor’s warranty unless the public 
records disclosed the appellant’s claim or unless cogent facts outside the records, duly 
brought to his attention, apprised him of it. 
Id.  
 92.  Int’l Harvester Co. of Am. v. Myers, 121 P. 500, 503 (Kan. 1912); see also In re Kasparek, 
No. 07-13019, 2009 WL 2366400, at *7–11 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2009) (providing an extremely 
thorough survey of the variety of inquiry notice cases under Kansas property law), rev’d on other 
grounds, 426 B.R. 332 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2010); see also Lane v. Courange, 359 P.2d 1115, 1116–19 
(Kan. 1961) (discussing inquiry notice duties and standards). 
 93.  See Int’l Harvester Co., 121 P. at 503 (“Information which makes it the duty of a party to 
inquire, and shows where such an inquiry may be effectual, is notice of all the facts which might be 
thereby ascertained.”); Jamison v. Dimock, 95 Pa. 52, 55–56 (1880) (discussing inquiry notice 
triggered by possession of another, holding that where “duty to make such inquiry” attaches, “having 
neglected to do so, [purchasers] were affected with constructive notice of such facts as would have 
come to their knowledge in the proper discharge of that duty”). 
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In Kuhn v. Wise, the Kansas Supreme Court in 1906 explained the 
basic principles regarding the raising of suspicions of a dirty deed that 
might trigger inquiry: “If the facts concerning the [subsequent 
purchaser’s] knowledge were such as would prompt a prudent man to 
inquire concerning [grantor’s] authority to sell and make conveyance, 
then he is chargeable with notice of the fraud, for an inquiry of the owner 
would have disclosed the absence of such authority.”
95
  Thus, if there is 
good reason for a purchaser to suspect that the grantor might lack 
authority to sell because grantor has already sold the same property to 
another—even where the purchaser does not yet have a reason to know 
that the grantor lacks such authority—the purchaser may not proceed to 
bona fide purchaser status unless and until he conducts further 
investigation.  And, if he chooses not to conduct the investigation, the 
purchaser will nonetheless be charged with the equivalence of actual 
knowledge of whatever facts he might have discovered if he had 
completed the mandated inquiry.  As the court in Kuhn continued when 
faced with an argument that a subsequent purchaser “should be protected 
as an innocent purchaser for value without knowledge of the facts,” the 
court explained that while “[a]ctual knowledge is not necessary,” 
nonetheless, “knowledge of circumstances sufficient to excite the 
suspicions of a prudent person and put upon inquiry is, as a general 




The most common trigger for the duty to inquire is the possession of 
                                                          
 94.  Schechter, supra note 62, at 119 (“[T]he system favors somewhat the prior transferee: 
when both the prior and subsequent transferees have failed to avoid the harm, the system breaks the 
tie by protecting the prior transferee.”); see also Bremerton Creamery & Produce Co. v. Elliott, 50 
P.2d 48 (Wash. 1935).  In Bremerton, the Washington Supreme Court dealt with the two relatively 
guilty parties—a prior interest holder who did not record and a subsequent purchaser who did not 
investigate and sided with the prior interest holder: 
It must be admitted that, in this case, blame rests upon each party.  Defendant had at his 
disposal a simple and easy method by which he could have protected his rights.  The 
filing for record in the office of the auditor of Kitsap county of a certified copy of the 
decree of distribution would have placed any purchaser of the land in that county upon 
notice of his claim.  On the other hand, plaintiff purchased the land and paid the 
consideration therefor without a careful investigation of the extent and nature of its 
grantor’s title.  In this connection, it is proper to consider that defendant’s lien is 
something entirely extraneous to the chain of title.  It rests upon an agreement . . .  
Id. at 54. 
 95.  Kuhn v. Wise, 135 P. 571, 573 (Kan. 1913). 
 96.  Id.  
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a property by someone other than the grantor.
97
  Inquiry can also be 
triggered from suspicious words or statements in recorded documents 
that cause one to question possible encumbrances on title (or use).
98
  
And, strikingly, in jurisdictions like Kansas, for example, quitclaim 
deeds are even possible triggers for inquiry by a purchaser on a 
presumption that, if a grantor proceeds by quitclaim deed, he is unwilling 
to warrant against defects in title and therefore a red flag may exist 
regarding the grantor’s authority to convey or lack thereof
99
—rather 
inexplicably so given the variety of legitimate and efficient reasons for 
transferring property by the quitclaim method. 
But, inquiry can be triggered in a whole variety of other ways too, 
even when the conveyance includes warranties or covenants of title like 
one gets with the transfer of a general warranty deed.  Even there, facts 
might nonetheless be present and surrounding the circumstances or 
parties to the transaction that cause the prudently curious or cautious 
buyer to ask additional questions as part of his due diligence.  When that 
is the case, the law does more than just suggest that such inquiry be 
made: it demands it.  It is that state of the law regarding inquiry notice 
that is further explored in Part V where extensions to it are proposed. 
Once the inquiry duty is triggered, the purchaser is required to make 
“such investigation as may reasonably be demanded of a person of 
ordinary diligence and understanding,” and if, after doing so, he “fails to 
ascertain the existence of the adverse claim, any inference of notice is 
rebutted” and the law acts as if there is no notice of any adverse claim.
100
  
Inquiry notice determinations by a court are highly fact-specific.
101
  And, 
                                                          
 97.  Int’l Harvester Co., 121 P. at 502–05 (cataloguing cases holding that possession by another 
is a trigger for inquiry notice and where those that do not investigate such open and notorious 
possession cannot be bona fide purchasers). 
 98.  5 TIFFANY, supra note 14, § 1262 (“[T]he record is notice not only of the instrument and of 
the facts stated therein, but also of any other matters as to which the necessity of an inquiry is 
suggested by statements in the instrument.”). 
 99.  Despite the fact that quitclaim deeds have many efficient uses (including sometimes to 
actually resolve title disputes) and many jurisdictions will not automatically eliminate bona fide 
purchaser status for the recipient of a quitclaim deed, some jurisdictions recognize that they may 
raise suspicions regarding title.  See, e.g., Pope v. Nichols, 59 P. 257, 259 (Kan. 1899) (finding 
quitclaim deeds raise special cautions that almost immediately require grantee to conduct further 
inquiry); Samuel Ashe Fitch, Vendor and Purchaser—Purchaser Under a Quitclaim Deed, 6 TEX. L. 
REV. 518, 518–19 (1928) (stating that quitclaim deed purchasers in Texas “may not raise the plea of 
a bona fide purchase for value and without notice as to prior unrecorded conveyances” because “the 
grantee, by the taking of a deed without warranties, has admitted the shortcomings of his vendor’s 
title; that he is therefore placed on notice as to its defects and should not be later heard to complain 
of the (if subjected to) assertion of an outstanding paramount title”). 
 100.  5 TIFFANY, supra note 14, § 1285; see also 3 PALOMAR, supra note 13, § 673 (describing 
diligence requirement in inquiry notice). 
 101.  5 TIFFANY, supra note 14, § 1285 (“Each case must, to a very considerable degree, depend 
 
26 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 64 
one need not make inquiry if such an effort would be futile,
102
 although it 




To sum up (and with an analogy to some (in)famous words of former 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld),
104
 consider the following 
characterizations of notice.  Bona fide purchasers will be protected 
against the unknown, or perhaps more precisely, they will be protected 
from the things that they do not know that they do not know.
105
 
There are the things we know that we know.  When there are “known 
known” adverse title claimants, notice of these parties strips a party from 
eligibility for holding bona fide purchaser status.
106
  There are those 
things that might be categorized as “known unknowns”—one knows 
something is potentially wrong and needs to search and investigate, i.e. 
conduct an inquiry, and dismiss the suspicions before he can proceed to 
warrant status as a bona fide purchaser.  And then there are the worst of 
all conditions—where there are things that a purchaser does not (and 
with available information cannot) know that he does not know, or the 
“unknown unknowns.”  This last category will most often be the 
situation where the prior purchaser has done nothing—by recording or 
otherwise—to make the public aware of the threat that his claim to title 
priority has for the acquisition of the same property by others.  Because 
of the market disruptive effects of these hidden facts—the “unknown 
                                                          
upon its own peculiar circumstances, and it is impossible to frame any absolute rule . . . .”).  
 102.  Lower’s Appeal, 1 Walk. 404, 412 (Pa. 1872) (finding the purchaser should not be 
prejudiced for not making inquiry if such inquiry would be fruitless or nonbeneficial); see also 5 
TIFFANY, supra note 14, § 1285. 
 103.  Therefore, the risk-averse purchaser may want to expend some resources doing at the very 
least a preliminary investigation from which there is a legitimate reason to believe further effort 
would be futile. 
 104.  In discussing the situation in Iraq and the possible existence of weapons of mass 
destruction, Donald Rumsfeld famously explained the differences between “known knowns,” 
“known unknowns,” and “unknown unknowns”: 
Reports that say that something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me, because as 
we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know.  We also know 
there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know.  
But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know.  And if 
one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter 
category that tend to be the difficult ones. 
Donald H. Rumsfeld, United States Sec’y of Def., DoD News Briefing-Secretary Rumsfeld and 
General Myers (Feb. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Rumsfeld Transcript], 
http://archive.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=2636. 
 105.  Metzger v. Mueller, 238 P.2d 802, 803 (Okla. 1951) (“The rule is well established that in 
the absence of actual or constructive notice of a previous conveyance, or of matters which would put 
a purchaser on inquiry, a bona fide purchaser for value will take a good title to the property.”). 
 106.  See Hutchinson v. Harttmann, 15 Kan. 133, 141 (Kan. 1875) (defining bona fide 
purchaser). 
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unknowns”—the prior titleholder, who is the least cost avoider of that 
state of public ignorance,
107
 will not be protected in his claim against a 
bona fide purchaser without notice.
108
 
Recording systems themselves are really just notice systems.
109
  By 
understanding when and how notice of adverse claims makes it into the 
information flow of the market and the legal consequences associated 
with the availability of adverse title facts, we can begin to understand the 
limited nature of the nemo dat exceptions associated with recording and 
the purposes for accepting those exceptions.  Although the recording 
laws are often explained in the ways discussed in this preceding Part, it is 
rare to see a discussion dissecting their specific relationship with, and 
effect on the strength and utility of, the nemo dat principle as Part IV will 
venture next to do.  The next Part explores in more detail the purposes 
behind tolerance for deviations from the nemo dat norm, and it begins to 
advocate for greater attention to ways that we can improve the system to 
minimize the occurrence and application of such deviations. 
IV. FURTHER ON IDENTIFYING THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN RECORDING 
PRIORITIES, NEMO DAT PREFERENCES, AND PROPERTY LAW 
PRAGMATISM 
The risk that a grantor will sell dirty deeds, where the same piece of 
property is conveyed more than one time and to more than one person, is 
not just a law school hypothetical; it is a real and recurring threat.
110
  Bad 
actors exist and will try to exploit holes in the legal system or time gaps 
                                                          
 107.  See infra Part IV.B (describing opportunities and obligations for prior and subsequent 
purchasers). 
 108.  Pomeroy, supra note 40, at 141 (explaining recording acts and title insurance are designed 
so that “bona fide purchasers of real property are protected against unknown third parties later 
claiming superior title or rights”). 
 109.  Douglas C. Harris & May Au, Title Registration and the Abolition of Notice in British 
Columbia, 47 U.B.C. L. REV. 535, 540 (2014) (identifying the recording or registry offices 
themselves as principally “‘notice’ systems”). 
 110.  See Scheid, supra note 13, at 102 (“Because a transfer of an interest in real property can be 
accomplished discreetly, the possibility of a grantor conveying an interest to one grantee and then 
conveying the same (or a lesser conflicting) interest to a subsequent grantee is a real one.”); Cory 
Torgesen, Comment, The Illinois Conveyances Act: A 200-Year-Old Labyrinth Whose Changing 
Walls Continue to Provide Inadequate Protection for Subsequent Purchasers, 37 S. ILL. U. L.J. 695, 
701 (2013) (“[T]ransactions involving bona fide subsequent purchasers are not uncommon.  Similar 
situations are widespread . . . .”); see also Kroetch v. Hinnenkamp, 18 P.2d 491, 491–92 (Wash. 
1933) (protecting bona fide subsequent purchaser in situation where a couple sold property once by 
warranty deed in 1910, but original purchaser did not record the deed until 1931, and in the interim, 
the couple sold the same property in 1929 to another by quitclaim deed and the deed was promptly 
recorded). 
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in recording to perpetrate these types of dirty deeds.
111
  It is this reality 
that has motivated policymakers to establish the systems of priority 
between purchasers that must be used to resolve contests between the 
grantees that may be subject to this type of grantor behavior.
112
  Even 
beyond those systems already in place, it is this reality that also calls for 
more experimentation with innovative measures like TINTS to protect 
against such bad behaviors, as is discussed further in Part V of this 
Article. 
Professor Audrey McFarlane makes several interesting observations 
on bad actors and the dirty deed phenomenon.
113
  Although her critique 
ends with a call for limits on the transactional and market-centered focus 
in setting property rules
114
 (something beyond what this Article would 
endorse), her analysis of the behaviors involved to which we should seek 
a remedy is instructive.  McFarlane describes the reality of property’s 
acceptance of certain “scurrilous behavior” as follows: 
In the first-year Property course, law professors have the unenviable 
task of introducing students to a difficult concept to grasp: the grantor 
O has the power to convey property to a first person, let’s say A, and 
then for whatever reason—fraud, deceit, caprice, or good-faith 
mistake—has the ability to re-convey the property to a second person, 
B.  In other words, O has the power to convey property twice.
115
 
                                                          
 111.  Cf. Black, supra note 5, at 525 (discussing principally con artist sales rather than multiple 
conveyances of a property one actually at one point owned, but nonetheless illustrating that “[i]n 
discussing property . . . we sometimes confront the situation where the seller does not actually own 
the property that he is trying to sell”).  Singer also poignantly explains that “[t]he problem of 
Holmes’s ‘bad man’ who wants to know what he can [get] away with turns out to be an especially 
tricky dilemma for property law.”  Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in Property Law, 46 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1369, 1432 (2013). 
 112.  See Reppy, supra note 54, at 198 (explaining outcomes in race-notice jurisdiction when 
grantor sells same property to two different people); Lesley Rowe, Note, The Decline and Fall of 
Constructive Notice, 65 MERCER L. REV. 1203, 1207 (2013) (“Under Georgia’s race-notice 
scheme . . . if two deeds from the same seller convey the same property, the recorded deed with a 
later date takes priority over the earlier unrecorded deed.”) (footnote omitted); Torgesen, supra note 
110, at 696–97 (discussing outcomes under each type of recording statute and using an example 
where grantor sells the same house to one person in the morning and another in the afternoon, which 
illustrates the pivotal role of notice when it is determinative). 
 113.  See McFarlane, supra note 3, at 882–86.  
 114.  Id. at 885–86 (explaining if we really want to stop fraud—a moral conclusion—then we 
will need to rein in “today’s instrumental rationale for property” and limit power of “the 
transactional nature of property” law). 
 115.  Id. at 883.  The seeming necessity to accept such fraud is particularly troubling because the 
victims of it are often poor, minorities, or otherwise disadvantaged.  See id. at 885 (arguing the lines 
we draw to find that some “force, fraud, and coercion” is “acceptable” are “drawn in a way that fails 
to acknowledge that force and fraud will be concentrated towards one end of the spectrum, or to say 
it another way, concentrated racially, by class and geography”). 
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The concept of a grantor selling property to B after he has already 
sold it once to A is difficult to wrap your arms around because it runs 
counter to our gut and our appreciation for the difference between right 
and wrong. 
This Part is intended to explain some of the policy choices that have 
been made in establishing title priorities knowing that those choices 
affect a deviation away from the nemo dat paradigm.  To understand how 
these rules have developed, and as a foundation for understanding later 
why we accept exceptions to the nemo dat principle, it will be helpful to 
examine a bit further, in the first section of this Part, the utility and 
purposes of real property recording systems. 
A. Recording Generally, Including Supporting a Stable, Predictable, 
Confident, and Transparent System of Property Transfers Toward 
Achieving High Levels of Certainty and Lower Levels of Risk 
Property transactions are dependent on a well-functioning system for 
the transfer and recordation of title.
116
  The fact is that recording systems 
are information systems; and, information is the currency through which 
efficient property transactions, including conveyancing and the transfer 
of title, operate.  As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in the 1868 
opinion in Patterson v. De La Ronde: 
[T]he object of all registry laws is to impart information to parties 
dealing with property respecting its transfers and incumbrances, and 
thus to protect them from prior secret conveyances and liens.  It is to 
the registry, therefore, that purchasers, or others desirous of 
ascertaining the condition of the property, must look, and if not 




A formalized system of property recordation becomes a fundamental 
institutional support for the market.
118
  The market has demanded and 
                                                          
 116.  See generally Kochan, supra note 2, at 270–72; see also Heather K. Way, Informal 
Homeownership in the United States and the Law, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 113, 120 (2009) 
(“Title is a legal construct that defines the ownership interest someone holds in an asset.  In the 
context of homeownership, title allows one to determine who owns what property interests in a 
home, and then determine who has legal authority to use, enjoy, encumber, and transfer the 
property.”) (footnote omitted). 
 117.  75 U.S. 292, 300 (1868). 
 118.  See, e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS 
IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 46–67 (2000) (explaining importance of “formal 
property system[s]” to capitalism in the West); HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE 
INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD 158–63 (June Abbott trans., 1989) [hereinafter DE 
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preferred the higher level of certain information and lower levels of risk 
that recording systems offer and has demonstrated a willingness to accept 
the limitations these systems place on the operation of the nemo dat 
principle and its corresponding attributes.
119
  Professor Joseph Singer 
explains that “[t]his system [of recording] helps clarify the state of the 
title and provides buyers with assurances that the person purporting to 
sell them land actually owns it and that the land is not subject to any 
competing claims or encumbrances,” because buyers must always be 
worried that claims may exist “that might conflict with their ability to 
obtain title or use the property as they wish.”
120
 
The recording system fits within a broader array of mechanisms by 
which owners of property seek title assurance.
121
  As Professor Heather 
Way explains, title assurance mechanisms—including recording 
systems—are designed to work toward providing efficient mechanisms 
for establishing clear title in a manner that minimizes disputes and allows 
property to flow freely and smoothly in commerce: 
One of the touchstones of real property security in the United States has 
been the creation of extensive title recording systems at the state level 
which create a written record of the chain of title.  These public 
recording systems, along with quiet title actions, laws that extinguish 
ancient claims, and other property laws, favor the creation of clear and 
reliable property interests, while disfavoring ambiguous or contested 
ownership interests.  Title insurance further facilitates the creation of 
secure title interests by insuring a property owner from third party 
claims to the property.
122
 
Every state in the United States has established some form of 
recording or registration infrastructure for real property.
123
  Recording is 
a local enterprise, where states develop rules for recording and local 
offices typically handle the actual recordation and indexing and serve as 
the critical repositories of information on title and the transfers of it for 
particular properties within a jurisdiction.
124
  Records and registration 
                                                          
SOTO, OTHER PATH) (explaining costs of not having “secure, reliable property rights”). 
 119.  See, e.g., McFarlane, supra note 3, at 885–86.  
 120.  SINGER, supra note 13, § 11.4.5.1, at 538. 
 121.  See Way, supra note 116, at 121. 
 122.  Id. (footnotes omitted); see also BENITO ARRUÑADA, INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
IMPERSONAL EXCHANGE: THEORY AND POLICY OF CONTRACTUAL REGISTRIES 2–4 (2012) 
(describing the market utility gained from publicizing property rights through registration systems). 
 123.  Pomeroy, supra note 40, at 141; Korngold, Resolving, supra note 18, at 1564 (“While the 
recording acts differ among the states in some respects, they share many common models, attributes, 
and goals.”). 
 124.  Tanya Marsh, Foreclosures and the Failure of the American Land Title Recording System, 
 
2015 DIRTY DEEDS 31 
offices are places that provide information individuals need to determine 
the state of title and the contents of deeds, in order to determine who 
owns what and with what conditions,
125
 and particularly to identify 
whether a property that one seeks to acquire or engage with in some 
other way is encumbered by other claimants.
126
 
The purpose of recording systems has always been the same: to 
provide a network of reliable, accessible, public, verifiable ownership 
information in a certain and identifiable place for inspection so that all 
parties interested in learning the title ownership status and other deed-
related details of property could find such information and feel confident 
in assessing their current or future relationship with that property based 
on the information they can find in the records offices.
127
 
There is no reason, however, to limit ourselves to providing 
informational inputs into this network only through traditional land 
records.  As we examine recording and its utility in this Part, one should 
start to see how other innovations designed to achieve the same goals as 
recording might also be adopted to supplement the network of 
information beyond what is provided in the recording system to even 
better achieve access to verifiable and perhaps even more complete title-
based information.  The reader should keep in mind the lessons the 
remainder of this Part will explain about recording when evaluating the 
proposal in Part V and in developing the reader’s own innovative ideas 
                                                          
111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 19, 20–24 (2011), http://www.columbialawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/03/19_Marsh.pdf (discussing the mechanics of recording and indexing and the 
problems and difficulties associated with the process).   
 125.  Way, supra note 116, at 122 (“Property laws that produce clear title interests make it easier 
to move property in the market in several ways.  They allow the market to determine who owns what 
interests in an asset and thus facilitate free trade of the asset on the open market.”) (footnote 
omitted); see also Pomeroy, supra note 40, at 147 (discussing predominance of notice-type 
recording statutes and their purpose to “protect subsequent transferees from all manner of secret 
transfers”). 
 126.  Korngold, Resolving, supra note 18, at 1564 (“The recording acts and related rules were 
developed to establish a public system of land records that would protect ownership interests in land 
and accurately reflect that information for anyone to examine.”).  
 127.  See Raymond H. Brescia, Leverage: State Enforcement Actions in the Wake of the Robo-
Sign Scandal, 64 ME. L. REV. 17, 21–22 (2011) (describing the useful functions of recording 
mechanisms).  De Soto also explains the broad utility of recording systems: 
[P]roperty has got to be in a place where everything is standardised, it’s got to be 
accountable, it’s got to be functional, you’ve got to make it liquid, it’s got a network, it’s 
got to protect transactions, and it’s got to be recorded. . . . [W]hat property does, is 
effectively it creates one of the world’s most important information systems that have 
ever existed.  You really know who owns what, and who has whose hand in whose 
pocket, and who has a claim and not, thanks to records. 
Hernando de Soto, Remarks at International Bar Association’s 2008 Annual Conference (Oct. 12, 
2008), in Law Connects, INT’L BAR NEWS, Dec. 2008, 14, 18 [hereinafter de Soto, Law Connects]. 
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for possible reforms. 
The recording acts have generated market confidence in the transfer 
of property in a very real way because buyers and sellers have greater 
predictability in the enforcement of their conveyances.
128
  Before 
recording systems were the norm and under the first-to-file priority 
systems where record offices were less common and mattered less, there 
was not a place to make a reliable search toward a confident conclusion 
regarding the existence or non-existence of competing title claimants or 
other adverse property interests. With recording requirements and norms, 
that gap is filled.  Property title gains indicia of quality, value, and utility 




Prospective purchasers, in particular, demand a verifiable repository 
of title information to guide their property acquisition decisions, along 
with demanding other backstop security devices (such as title insurance, 
for example) for when that system is incomplete or otherwise 
unsatisfactory in its level of protection.
130
  The records offices strive to 
supply that product (although there are, of course, imperfections and 
unreliable elements to these offices—as with any bureaucratic system 
and especially ones that are still largely dependent on old paper-based 
records systems—those complications are beyond the scope of this 
Article).  Although this Article is concerned principally with clear and 
identifiable title between two successive purchasers of property, there is 
no doubt that many others besides those competing for title also demand 




                                                          
 128.  Gerald Korngold, Legal and Policy Choices in the Aftermath of the Subprime and 
Mortgage Financing Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 727, 739–40 (2009) [hereinafter Korngold, Legal and 
Policy Choices] (examining the development of recording acts in the United States that have 
“allowed buyers of interests in real property to trade in confidence and encouraged markets for sales 
and financing”). 
 129.  Hernando de Soto, Why Capitalism Works in the West but Not Elsewhere, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB. (Jan. 5, 2001), http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/why-capitalism-works-west-not-
elsewhere (“To be useful in an expanded market, capital must first be represented in a property 
document where it can then be assigned a status that allows it to produce additional value.  What 
most people possess outside the West is not ‘paperized’ in such a way as to produce capital.”). 
 130.  See id. 
 131.  Way, supra note 116, at 122.  Professor Way explains:  
Clear title also facilitates outside investments in property by allowing creditors to have 
faith in the property interest they are securing.  When title interests are insecure or 
unclear, creditors will either refuse to invest in the property or, alternatively, devalue the 
asset to take into account the higher risk of the investment or the transactional costs of 
making the title interests more secure. 
Id.  See also Levinz v. Will, 1 Dall. 430, 433 (Pa. 1789) (“Property is the foundation of credit.”); DE 
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Property recording systems provide valuable reference material for 
all sorts of individuals and entities interested in learning about the title, 
deeds, and other characteristics associated with a piece of property.
132
  
The repositories of records provide a level of transparency that allows 
markets in property to operate, including the capability to discover who 
holds title to what under what deed terms and with what conditions, or to 
identify what other parties are involved with the property in one way or 
another to complicate the matter legally.
133
  Instability in property 
markets arises when such features of a parcel of property are not 
exposed, cannot be examined, and have not been committed to the public 
memory system for use in evaluating transactions related to the 
property.
134
  Markets in property can operate efficiently but only with 
optimal levels of information and systems for the verifiability of 
information, including records offices and neutral courts.
135
 
Recording systems connect participants in the marketplace for 
property, providing accessible public knowledge databases.
136
  Because 
there are means of verifying title, market participants can have a higher 
degree of confidence—i.e. a higher degree of certainty—in what they 
and other parties with whom they will interact own and have authority to 
transfer.  Importantly, the market participants and the enforcement 
machine—principally courts—can all use the system to make 
                                                          
SOTO, OTHER PATH, supra note 118, at 162 (explaining the absence of reliable property systems 
“inhibit the use of property as collateral, one of the various benefits traditionally conferred on 
property owners”); id. (“This is because a lender must make the same costly investments as a 
purchaser in order to make sure that the property is under the borrower’s control and that, in the 
event of a default, the property can be obtained with the same rights as those enjoyed by the present 
owner.”).   
 132.  Marsh, supra note 124, at 20 (describing the goals of the recording system, particularly the 
provision of notice to the world, including to prospective buyers). 
 133.  Korngold, Resolving, supra note 18, at 1564 (“This system has served to create an active 
and safe American real estate market by providing security of titles and realty interests, enabling the 
efficient use of land as collateral for loans, and allowing prospective buyers to locate owners and 
bargain with them over potential deals.”); see also de Soto, Law Connects, supra note 127, at 18 
(explaining we do not know who owns what without clear records). 
 134.  Hernando de Soto, The Destruction of Economic Facts, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Apr. 
28, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_19/b4227060634112.htm 
(describing recording systems as “public memory systems”). 
 135.  Korngold, Resolving, supra note 18, at 1562 (“The land records system and related rules 
should be designed to create a high-functioning, efficient market.”); Thomas J. Miceli et al., The 
Dynamic Effects of Land Title Systems, 47 J. URBAN ECON. 370, 370 (2000) (“[T]he more clearly 
defined the property rights, the greater the land market efficiency.”); see also Mark Ellis, Legal 
Profession Must Shape Our Post-Crisis Future, INT’L BAR NEWS, Oct. 2010, at 7 (crediting de Soto 
for articulating why “clarity of legal title has been the foundation of all modern economic growth”). 
 136.  de Soto, Law Connects, supra note 127, at 18 (explaining when the recording system is 
non-existent or failing, then “[w]hat you’ve lost is your capacity to connect, because you’ve lost the 
track that property gives you”). 
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determinations on relative priorities of title and other deed rights.  
Judicial outcomes are predictable, and parties can transact against 
reliable assessments of enforceability risks, based on those predictions. 
Security, stability, and verifiability of title become operational with 
title recording systems.
137
  Confidence in making investments and 
improvements in property follows.
138
  The more secure title is, the more 
that an owner can demand for the property, because a buyer is willing to 
pay for that strong asset associated with the property.  Real value in 
“ownership” of property is determined by the degree to which these 
additional asset qualities—confidence, certainty, stability, predictability, 
and enforceability of title—obtain.
139
 
All in all, certainty of ownership is vital in facilitating private 
market-based transactions for property, and records in recording offices 
provide that benefit in a way that unrecorded title documents cannot.
140
  
Willingness to invest in property or to extend credit on good terms based 
on property as a security device is directly proportional with the level of 
certainty in title, the concomitant level of risk, and the confidence the 
investor has in being able to identify the legitimacy of the enforceable 
title.
141
  Investment risk is lower when title is more certain.
142
 
Similarly, owners will not improve property that they are not entirely 
confident they own.  If you are always worried about a knock on the door 
from an adverse claimant, you will be less likely to labor and invest to 
improve your property because you fear losing the fruits of that effort.  If 
the recording system is structured in a way where such an owner can 
attain a higher level of confidence, society is better off because the 
                                                          
 137.  McFarlane, supra note 3, at 863 (“[T]here is little debate that the underlying purpose and 
goal of property law is to promote and support stability.”); David E. Woolley & Lisa D. Herzog, 
MERS: The Unreported Effects of Lost Chain of Title on Real Property Owners, 8 HASTINGS BUS. 
L.J. 365, 368 (2012) (“[T]he stability of the land title is paramount in preserving land ownership and 
maintaining civil harmony . . . .”). 
 138.  Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 
552–59 (2005) (discussing generally the importance of stability in property ownership and policing 
mechanisms for the same). 
 139.  Id. at 552 (“[A] property system with stable rights increases the value of assets to users 
(now owners) and decreases the costs of obtaining and defending those assets.”). 
 140.  Schechter, supra note 62, at 109 (acknowledging that “a number of commentators seem to 
agree that the fundamental goal of any recording system is to promote the certainty of land titles” 
and agreeing that “certainty is an important goal of the system, but it is not the only goal”). 
 141.  de Soto, Law Connects, supra note 127, at 16 (“[G]lobally . . . the problem is that nobody’s 
going to invest unless they know who owns it, or that they own it. Nobody’s going to remove the 
rocks; nobody’s going to put in the irrigation systems or the roads, until they feel they own it.”). 
 142.  Id. at 14 (“[T]hrough law and legal documents . . . you’re able to identify facts [and] able to 
identify risks.”). 
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property will be put to higher and better uses and move in commerce.
143
 
So, the existence of neutral, third-party means of verifiability to 
which market participants can turn to identify who owns what (including 
authoritative repositories of title information through recording and a 
judicial system that will enforce rights according to understood terms) 
has market-lubricating effects that produce the market-induced values 
that we attach to property.
144
  In the words of Hernando de Soto, being 
serious about recording “allows the whole economy to move.”
145
 
B. The Role for Responsibility: Opportunities and Obligations of Prior 
and Subsequent Purchasers 
Whether one is talking about the recording laws in the United States 
or registry laws elsewhere, these laws create systems that reflect the 
necessity to make a choice between two often seemingly innocent parties 
who each purchased the same property from the same grantor, usually 
leaning toward the protections created for later-in-time bona fide 
purchasers against those holding prior-conveyed title.
146
  Choices must 
be made between multiple claimants to property and inevitably someone 
will lose and his rights will be subordinated in the zero-sum decision to 
award property to the other.
147
  We cannot have a stable system if both 
parties have equal claim to the property.
148
  McFarlane calls this choice a 
“market-smoothing mechanism” and explains that “in the case of a 
dispute, recording acts are tailored to protect buyers and sellers, but not 
owners.  Thus fraud, despite our protestations to the contrary, is part of 
                                                          
 143.  Way, supra note 116, at 121 (“American property laws supporting clear title and more 
formal landholdings have historically promoted two key values: security and alienability.  Security 
in ownership—the principle that an owner’s property rights cannot be taken away, except by the 
government with just compensation—is a fundamental attribute of American property ownership.”); 
cf. McFarlane, supra note 3, at 882 (explaining the recording system promotes alienability while 
expressing concern over that fact). 
 144.  Id. at 885 (“Recording acts reflect an unquestioned principle that a market-based property 
system must contain a market-smoothing mechanism.”). 
 145.  de Soto, Law Connects, supra note 127, at 16 (“[P]roperty paper . . . is what allows the 
whole economy to move.”). 
 146.  See, e.g., Harris & Au, supra note 109, at 536 (explaining that registry statutes and rules 
must “find a balance between defending existing interests in land and facilitating transfers,” and that 
they necessarily “reflect a policy choice in systems of land law to provide greater certainty for 
purchasers of interests in land at the expense of those holding existing interests”). 
 147.  McFarlane, supra note 3, at 885 (“[R]ecording acts facilitate the property markets, but also 
can and do undercut property ownership.  Recording acts promote commerce, but sometimes at the 
expense of the individual.”). 
 148.  Id. at 863 n.34 (citing sources regarding the principle of setting property rules where they 
best promote stability). 
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property.”
149
  We know that there will be losers and that bad actors may 
get away with their dirty deeds, although we try to find ways to both 
punish and deter the bad actors. 
Whereas first-in-time and common law priority conform with a 
stricter adherence to the nemo dat maxim,
150
 modern recording laws that 
adopt notice or race-notice priority rules favor the subsequent “innocent” 
purchaser and represent a relaxation of the nemo dat rules.
151
  The 




Recording statutes try to balance protecting existing owners by 
giving those parties methods for providing constructive notice through 
recording and protecting careful bona fide purchasers who search in 
advance of purchasing and find no competing, adverse prior interests.
153
  
Proponents of notice and race-notice recording laws contend that while 
the first purchaser may in fact be innocent at the time of the transaction, 
the law places upon that party certain affirmative duties if he is to 
maintain that innocence.
154
  He has a responsibility to himself and also to 
the public to make it known that he has laid claim to the property.
155
  The 
failure to warn other parties of his claim by making a public record of it 
becomes a type of irresponsible (and some even say fraudulent) act in 
and of itself that unnecessarily imposes uncertainty, risk, and high 
information-gathering costs on others.
156
 
                                                          
 149.  Id. at 884. 
 150.  See SINGER, supra note 13, § 11.4.5.2, at 541–44. 
 151.  See Reppy, supra note 54, at 197–98. 
 152.  See Cunningham v. Norwegian Lutheran Church of Am., 184 P.2d 834, 840 (Wash. 1947). 
 153.  McFarlane, supra note 3, at 883. 
 154.  In Poplin v. Mundell, the Kansas Supreme Court was confronted with a case involving 
identifying the duty of the first purchaser to record where the clerk was the sole party in error in 
recording and making deed publicly available so that subsequent purchaser was unable to discover 
competing claim.  27 Kan. 138, 139–41 (Kan. 1882).  Despite recognizing some exceptions and 
difficult choices in those circumstances, the general and usually applicable rule, absent special 
circumstances, is as follows: 
[I]t is held that the obligation rests on the party holding the conveyance to give the notice 
required by the statute.  It is said that he controls the conveyance, and can put it on record 
or not, at his pleasure; that if from any cause he falls short of giving legal notice, the 
consequences must fall on himself; that it is his own business, and that he must suffer the 
consequences of its being imperfectly performed; that it is the duty of the party filing the 
instrument, as between him and subsequent bona fide purchaser, to see that all of the 
prerequisites of a valid and complete registration are complied with. 
Id. at 157. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Schechter, supra note 62, at 123 (explaining why all prior transferees are subject to the 
same burden regardless of whether their non-recording was negligent or fraudulent because in both 
cases they are the cause of unnecessary cost to the system). 
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With the great privilege of property ownership comes a low cost 
responsibility to record one’s interest.
157
  As the U.S. Supreme Court 
explained, resolving these conflicts “in equity requires that the loss, 
which in consequence thereof must fall on one of the two, shall be borne 
by him by whose fault it was occasioned.”
158
  And, the “fault” is usually 
identified as the non-publicizing of the prior purchaser’s claim to title.
159
  
One leading treatise explains that the law is forced to recognize that, 
between two claimants, one must lose, and important policies support 
and outweigh what at first appears to be the “trampling” of the rights of 
prior purchasers of property: 
This involuntary loss of rights results from the overwhelming public 
policy of encouraging trade by guarding buyers regardless of what 
individual legal rights may be trampled in the dust.  Since our 
civilization cannot live without trade and since trade cannot exist 
without buyers and since no buyer will pay adequate consideration 
unless he is certain of receiving good title when he parts with his 
consideration, such civilization must provide a means of guaranteeing 
that he will receive an indefeasible title.  The “bona fide purchaser” 
rule is the result.  If one is a “bona fide purchaser” he takes good title.  




If the first purchaser fails to protect himself by providing record 
notice to the world, he is negligent at best
161
 and fraudulent or deceptive 
at worst,
162
 and it is seen as not unjust that the prior interest holder will 
                                                          
 157.  See ANDERSON & BOGART, supra note 17, at 541 (explaining the “minimal step” of 
recording that the law encourages in order to avoid losing property to a subsequent purchaser).  
 158.  Neslin v. Wells, 104 U.S. 428, 437 (1881). 
 159.  See id. 
 160.  8 GEORGE W. THOMPSON & JOHN S. GRIMES, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF 
REAL PROPERTY § 4312, at 363 (repl. 1963). 
 161.  1 PALOMAR, supra note 13, § 17 (“Grantees who fail to give notice by recording their 
conveyances negligently leave the way open for their grantors to convey to others who have no 
notice of a prior transfer.”). 
 162.  The U.S. Supreme Court has explained why it is somewhat like a “fraud” if the first 
purchaser does not give notice by recording when that option to protect himself is available: 
The rule to be applied here is merely an extension of that declared by Lord Chancellor 
Macclesfield in Savage v. Foster (9 Mod. 35, 37),—“When anything in order to a 
purchase is publicly transacted, and a third person knowing thereof, and of his own right 
to the lands intended to be purchased, and doth not give the purchaser notice of such 
right, he shall never afterwards be admitted to set up such right to avoid the purchase; for 
it was an apparent fraud in him not to give notice of his title to the intended 
purchaser . . . .” 
Neslin, 104 U.S. at 438–39.  Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in examining a very early 
recording statute, discussed how we encourage recording to “prevent honest purchasors, or 
mortgagees, of real estates, from being deceived by prior secret conveyances, or 
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lose in a battle with a subsequent purchaser without notice (especially if 
the lack of notice is due to the failure to record on the part of the first 
grantee).
163
  As Professor Dan Schechter explains, it is a matter of setting 
burdens to minimize costs: 
[O]nce the challenger—the subsequent transferee—crosses the “harm 
threshold,” the recording system then determines whether the parties 
have used reasonable means to avoid the harm and have thus crossed 
the “cost avoidance threshold.”  If the subsequent transferee has failed 
to take advantage of a reasonable opportunity to avoid the harm, then 
the inquiry ends, even if the prior unrecorded transferee caused the 
problem in the first place [by not recording].
164
 
Similarly stated, the displacement of prior purchasers in favor of 
subsequent bona fide purchasers without notice might be justified as 
placing the burden on the “cheapest cost-avoider.”
165
  Recording itself is 
relatively low cost, and it should be done by the person who knows of 
their own claim rather than requiring some lengthy and impossible 
investigation by every purchaser to ascertain from the hinterlands all 
possible adverse claims, all of which lie outside their personal 




Unrecorded (and undiscoverable) title claims are problematic.  
Technically, the absence of evidence of a prior claim is not evidence of 
the absence of a prior claim, because there may be a claim, just an 
unrecorded one.
167
  But the absence of evidence in the recording context 
                                                          
incumberances . . . .”  Levinz v. Will, 1 Dall. 430, 435 (Pa. 1789).  
 163.  Consider the following from the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Neslin: 
Who would be willing, or could afford, to purchase under such circumstances, if after 
every reasonable effort to inform himself of possible incumbrances a mortgagee holding 
an incumbrance of prior date, and whose failure to give such public notice of the fact as 
the law had furnished the means of giving had betrayed him into the purchase, should 
nevertheless be permitted to supersede his title, by asserting a parmount [sic] lien?  
Certainly there would be no injustice, and we think no violation of legal principle, in such 
circumstances, in preferring over his claim that of the innocent party, who otherwise 
would suffer loss, occasioned by a fraud which his laches alone hed [sic] made effective. 
Neslin, 104 U.S. at 436 (emphasis added). 
 164.  Schechter, supra note 62, at 118. 
 165.  1 PALOMAR, supra note 13, § 17. 
 166.  Id.  
 167.  Secretary Donald Rumsfeld borrowed Carl Sagan’s famous phrasing regarding the 
existence of extraterrestrial life, that “the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence,” in his 
“known unknowns” news conference.  See Rumsfeld Transcript, supra note 104.  See also CARL 
SAGAN, THE DEMON HAUNTED WORLD 213 (1996); Roger Cohen, Rumsfeld Is Correct—the Truth 
Will Get Out, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/iht/2006/06/07/world/IHT-
07globalist.html. 
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might as well be “evidence of absence” for purposes of the recording 
laws, unless something else sparks a suspicion that triggers an inquiry for 
a purchaser to find such an adverse claim.
168
  When a title claim does not 
appear in the records, it is the equivalent under the law of the prior claim 
not existing at all, as the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned in Neslin: 
[T]o withhold from the record conveyances or incumbrances in their 
own favor is a waiver of their right, and equivalent to a representation 
that they do not exist, in favor of innocent subsequent purchasers, who 
otherwise would be wrongfully affected by them.  It is a case for the 
application of the maxim, idem est non esse at non apparere.  It applies 
to cases of negligence as well as of fraud, for the injurious 
consequences of both are not distinguishable.
169
 
We accept the legal fiction that the prior purchaser in effect 
“created” the ignorance of the subsequent purchaser.
170
  This holds true, 
of course, with the unrecorded instrument being definitive of the 
subsequent buyer’s innocence and bona fides, only so long as the 




Similarly, some courts base this choice to allow subordination of the 
first purchaser’s claim to title on the idea that the first purchaser is 
essentially “permitting the fraud” to occur.
172
  By not recording and 
leaving open the opportunity for bad grantors to conduct their dirty deeds 
and convey to unwitting subsequent purchasers, some theories hold that 
the first grantee is guilty of “constructive fraud” and consequently the 
first grantee is the one that in all fairness should bear the loss of not 
owning the property.
173
  Other courts reach the same result granting 
winner status to the ignorant bona fide purchaser based on an estoppel 
theory—first purchasers are estopped from claiming ownership because 
they failed to take advantage of the opportunities made available by the 
                                                          
 168.  See Rumsfeld Transcript, supra note 104. 
 169.  Neslin, 104 U.S. at 439 (emphasis added). 
 170.  See id. 
 171.  Faris v. Finnup, 113 P. 407, 409 (Kan. 1911) (“Such a purchaser may assume the 
nonexistence of any instrument which has not been made valid against him in this manner [of 
recording]” but can be “deprived of the benefit of this assumption [by] information that a prior deed 
is in fact outstanding and unrecorded”). 
 172.  1 PALOMAR, supra note 13, § 17. 
 173.  Id.; Lessee of Henry v. Morgan & Cox, 2 Binn. 497, 502 (Pa. 1810) (describing intent of 
bona fide purchaser protections in recording acts as “to protect innocent purchasers from suffering 
by the fraud or negligence of those, who had obtained prior conveyances from the same person, and 
omitted to have them recorded”). 
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law to protect their own interest,
174
 mainly by recording and giving 
public notice that would have defeated the ability for a subsequent 
purchaser to make an adverse claim.
175
 
But it is really even more than just a mere assignment of 
responsibility that is supporting the courts’ conclusions regarding 
priority.  Instead, many contend that a first purchaser who does not 
record has simply failed to do what is necessary to become an owner, and 
that he has left an interest, indeed a power of sale, with the grantor until 
that first purchaser records.
176
  One must do more than just dole out 




Here is how the idea flows: The law has created a type of semantic 
fiction to overcome the confounding confrontation with nemo dat that the 
recording acts create.  According to the formalistic explanations for why 
one can sell land to A and sell again later the same land to B, the grantor 
is empowered to do so whenever the first purchaser A has not yet 
recorded because, by not recording, A has yet to take the authority to sell 
away from the grantor.  When the original grantee has yet to record, the 
original grantor has yet to lose his authority to convey to another 
purchaser.  The next few paragraphs spell this rationale out further. 
In notice and race-notice jurisdictions, the seeming lack of authority 
on the part of a grantor to sell to a second purchaser after already selling 
to someone else is simply not debilitating to such a sale.  When such a 
thing happens, the subsequent purchasers maintain an ability to attain 
bona fide purchaser status.
178
  The problem with unrecorded deeds is 
that, in most jurisdictions, the original purchaser by failing to record has 
not yet converted the equitable title that he received (at the point of 
conveyance) into a legal title (which happens after conveyance and at the 
                                                          
 174.  The Washington Supreme Court explained this necessity of weighing between two 
innocents as follows: 
When we apply the rule of comparative innocence, it is impossible to escape the 
conclusion that the judgment must be affirmed.  As between two innocent persons, one of 
whom must suffer a loss, appellant is obviously the one who is responsible therefor.  He 
failed to have his property correctly described in his deed and then failed to have it 
recorded.  He failed to do as the ordinarily prudent and cautious individual does . . . .  
Appellant had ample opportunity to protect himself and did nothing.  Respondent did 
everything that could be expected of it. 
Cunningham v. Norwegian Lutheran Church of Am., 184 P.2d 834, 840 (Wash. 1947). 
 175.  1 PALOMAR, supra note 13, § 17. 
 176.  Id. (“Grantees who fail to give notice . . . leave the way open for their grantors to convey to 
others who have no notice of a prior transfer.”). 
 177.  See id. 
 178.  See id. § 11 (explaining the essential elements of a bona fide purchase). 
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point the property is recorded—provided of course that there is not a 
competing legal title claim at that time).
179
  That reality means that until 
that point in time when the conveyance is recorded, the grantee is leaving 
the grantor free to exploit the gap and gives the dirty grantor an 
opportunity to try to pass the same title to another, i.e. the grantor 
“retains, by force of the statute, a power to defeat the conveyance, if not 
recorded, by a subsequent conveyance to another.”
180
 
Consider the explanation of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in an 
opinion that was required to wrestle with this very issue: 
For instance, in the typical recording statute situation, a grantor sells 
land to a grantee who does not record the deed; then, a subsequent 
buyer purchases the same land from the same grantor as the original 
grantee and this subsequent grantee records his deed before the first 
grantee.  The subsequent grantee does not have [so-called] “legal title” 
within the Appellant’s definition because at the time the land was sold 
to him, the grantor did not have legal title to give such right.  Yet, 
notwithstanding the fact that he does not have “legal title,” he is a bona 
fide purchaser if at the time of the sale he was without notice of an 
adverse interest and value was given for the purchase of the land.  As 
evidenced here, imposing a requirement of “legal title” to the definition 
of a bona fide purchaser would nearly render the recording statute 
useless.  We, therefore, find no merit in Appellants’ argument.
181
 
In essence, the grantor retains a “power of sale” despite the seeming 
lack of authority (because he has already sold it once).
182
  His authority, 
in that sense, is not dissolved until the grantee records.
183
 
And, indeed, if one looks at it in this way, then a bona fide purchaser 
does not “take” anything away from a prior purchaser who did not 
                                                          
 179.  5 TIFFANY, supra note 14, § 1262 (“[A] deed after it is delivered and before it is recorded 
operates as a contract to convey, and passes to the grantee an equitable title and right to the formal 
legal title . . . .”). 
 180.  Id.  As Professor Aigler stated: 
The Recording Acts of the various states differ in their phraseology, but the substance of 
most of them may be stated in this way: Certain instruments as to certain people are 
ineffective unless the statute is complied with. . . . The effect of the statute really is that 
the person claiming under the instrument in question by his failure to observe the 
direction of the statute confers upon the party who executed the instrument . . . a sort of 
statutory power to displace the interest vested by the execution of the instrument.  This 
power may be effectively exercised only in favor of those specified in the statute, usually 
subsequent purchasers and incumbrancers. . . . The failure to record simply puts someone 
into position to divest that interest. 
Aigler, supra note 9, at 415. 
 181.  Roberts v. Estate of Pursley, 718 A.2d 837, 841 (Pa. 1998) (citation omitted). 
 182.  1 PALOMAR, supra note 13, § 17 (“[S]o long as [a conveyance] is not recorded the 
purchaser leaves in his grantor both the record title and a power of sale.”). 
 183.  Id. 
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record; the prior purchaser simply did not do what was necessary to 
effectuate their interest.
184
  Professor Ralph Aigler provides the following 
crisp example: 
So in the simplest sort of case involving the application of the 
Recording Act—a deed to B and a later deed of the same premises to X, 
a bona fide purchaser—if B recorded, X gets nothing, not because he 
took with notice, but because B had omitted nothing in the saving of his 
common law priority,—there was no power in the grantor to displace 
the first grantee’s interest; and if B had not recorded, then he loses out 
not because X took without notice but because B’s failure put the 




Thus, by not acting responsibly, the prior purchaser has not done 
enough to protect his rights and concomitantly strip the grantor of his 
power to convey to another. 
It is precisely the “incentivization” of recording aimed toward every 
holder of an interest in property (including and especially those that are 
first in time to receive it) that is intended within the structure of the 
recording acts.
186
  Through what might be called the “completion of the 
conveyance process” that recording provides (and the benefits that 
recording brings through protection for title), the prior purchaser avoids 
the consequences of displacement by disempowering the grantor from 
effectively selling again. 
Finally, out of responsibility comes opportunity.  Rather than being 
seen as simply designed as a means for making it harder for first-in-time 
purchasers to protect their interests against bona fide purchasers (and 
consequently easier for bona fide purchasers to make their claim), the 
recording system serves a concurrent function by opening up 
opportunities for first-in-time purchasers to add a valuable attribute to 
their property title that did not exist in the common law, pre-recording 
                                                          
 184.  As Professor Rogers explains the failure on the part of the first purchaser to fully establish 
her rights: 
[I]t is a bit misleading to say that someone is a bona fide purchaser and therefore takes 
free of a prior claim.  Qualifying as a bona fide purchaser may be a necessary condition 
for invocation of a rule cutting off prior claims, but the basis of such rules is usually that 
the prior interest was itself not properly effectuated.   
James Steven Rogers, Negotiability as a System of Title Recognition, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 197, 203 
(1987). 
 185.  Aigler, supra note 9, at 415. 
 186.  Pomeroy, supra note 40, at 141 (discussing universality of recording acts and their design 
to incentivize “creditors and claimants to record publicly any claims they might have to real 
property”). 
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environment. 
The recording laws make it easier for first-in-time purchasers to 
establish a verifiable, certain, and enforceable claim to property in a 
manner that actually deters litigation by adverse claimants because of the 
certainty and authority of the recording system.
187
  For little cost, they 
can provide great protection.  Recording and its consequences also 
decrease litigation costs because the first-in-time purchaser need not 
prove his case in an exhaustive evidentiary battle against adverse 
claimants.  Even when he could win such an evidentiary battle, the 
prospect of litigation alone has adverse effects on the market for 
property.  For example, even when he could prove his case, the first-in-
time title claimant would need to expend substantial costs before getting 
to a judicial resolution in his favor.  As Professor Dan Schechter 
explains, “The [recording] system promotes certainty in the transfer of 
interests in real property by encouraging parties to avoid costs by 
recording and making diligent inquiry,” and, “[i]n turn, certainty 
enhances the price that transferees are willing to pay for property, thus 
enhancing the value of the property itself.”
188
  So, we return again to the 
point that the law favors those things that encourage recording because 
recording increases the value of property. 
There are several ways that uncertain or high-risk title can inhibit the 
market for property or add unnecessary costs, including where 
“prospective transferees might avoid acquiring property interests 
altogether, might purchase more insurance against the risk of loss than 
they otherwise would, might require extensive guarantees from the 
grantor, or might take other measures to cushion themselves against 
loss.”
189
  To the extent we can develop a system that avoids these 




Thus, we again return to the idea that multiple beneficiaries of the 
recording system must make certain investments and buy into the 
system, and when they do they will be guaranteed rewards.  A 
consequence of the institution of recording statute regimes certainly 
                                                          
 187.  Palestina, supra note 13, at 995 (“[A] system of public recordation should provide both 
security and stability for the property rights of owners. . . . [I]t should facilitate the transfer of 
property between buyers and sellers such that property remains in commerce.”). 
 188.  Schechter, supra note 62, at 120 (footnote omitted). 
 189.  Id. (footnote omitted).  
 190.  Rogers, supra note 184, at 216 (speaking generally about all types of title registration or 
recording, and stating that “[t]he goal of a system of title recognition should be to provide assurance 
of title to purchasers by enabling them to discover the existence of adverse claims before purchasing 
the property”). 
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includes protecting bona fide purchasers that would otherwise lose in a 
first-in-time system and who were the subject of dirty deed transfers on 
the part of unscrupulous or mistaken grantors, but that is not the only 
brilliance of the design.  The purpose was never to make it easier to 
displace first-in-time purchasers.  In fact, it empowers first-in-time 
claimants with a weapon—recording—that they also did not have in a 
common law priority system to shut out altogether potential adverse 
subsequent purchasers. 
It is evident that this other purpose of the recording laws is to shrink 
the pool of potential, legitimate bona fide purchasers and decrease the 
number of competing claims that need to be resolved in litigation.  By 
recording, a purchaser is effectively shutting others out from claiming 
title or achieving the status necessary to claim title.  The net plus for the 
market for property from fewer title contests and fewer title contestants 
cannot be ignored. 
Any improvements that can be made that would further shrink the 
pool of potential, legitimate bona fide purchasers by injecting 
information helps get us closer to the goal of protecting first-in-time 
purchasers and consequently supporting achievement of the nemo dat 
ideal where one cannot sell the same property to more than one 
purchaser.  That is the goal of TINTS, for example, as will be further 
explained in Part V.  Such innovations in information-generating 
mechanisms would not be designed to shrink the pool of protected 
buyers through means that punish any innocents, but instead these 
innovations would be aimed at making it harder to be innocent by 
making it easier to access more complete information regarding 
competing claims to title. 
For each of the reasons discussed above, recording one’s interests 
has become a legal responsibility with real consequences flowing from 
one’s failure to fulfill that responsibility.  For any purchaser of property 
seeking to avoid subordination of his interests, recording just makes 
sense.  By recording the title conveyed to it, a purchaser has the ability to 
make it much harder for the grantee to commit fraud because his dirty 
deeds will be transparent and easily revealed upon an inspection of the 
records.
191
  Once a property is recorded, the ability to successfully carry 
                                                          
 191.  Schechter, supra note 62, at 110–11.  Professor Schechter makes this point well when he 
states that: 
[W]ithout a recording system, a grantor could more easily convey the same interest in 
real property a number of times and then abscond with the consideration given by the 
transferees, leaving them to fight over the property.  In contrast, a transferee who can 
record his interest gives notice to subsequent prospective transferees, thus protecting 
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out a fraudulent re-conveyance without exposure and liability is severely 
diminished.  Such fraud deterrence is one of the important rationales 




C.  Setting the Bar: Aiming for a Nemo Dat Ideal, While Accepting 
Property Law Pragmatism But Only When Necessary 
At common law and with first-in-time rules applicable, nemo dat 
carried the day.
193
  Between equal equities, the first-in-time would win,
194
 
which means too that the first-in-time purchaser would win against a 
subsequent purchaser even if that subsequent purchaser did not have 
notice of the prior claim.
195
  That system for establishing priority most 
closely approximated an adherence to a pure application of the nemo dat 
principle. 
The recipient of a conveyance after property had previously been 
conveyed would lose under common law priority rules because the 
grantor would be attempting to sell more than was lawfully available to 
him to sell.  All of that changed with the recording acts, each of which 
essentially opens a window that can sometimes allow a situation in 
which property sold once can effectively be sold a second time by the 
same grantor.
196
  Our policies shifted over time to reflect an 
                                                          
himself and other grantees against the grantor’s fraud. 
Id. 
 192.  Id. at 112 (“[T]he fraud deterrence rationale partly explains why relying classes of 
subsequent transferees would be protected, while the certainty rationale partly explains why some 
unrecorded transfers not involving fraud are nevertheless invalidated.”). 
 193.  5 TIFFANY, supra note 14, § 1257 (describing nemo dat at common law and explaining that 
the recording acts are a “very considerable departure from” the rule that “one who has no title cannot 
transfer title to another, one who has transferred his legal estate to one person cannot thereafter 
detract from the effectiveness of such transfer by undertaking to transfer it to another”); Ortman, 
supra note 21, at 465 n.18 (“The theory behind the common law doctrine was that the grantor had 
nothing left to convey to the later grantee.” (citing 1 R. & C. PATTON, PATTON ON TITLES § 8 (2d ed. 
1957))). 
 194.  Neslin v. Wells, 104 U.S. 428, 441 (1881) (“[T]he maxim quoted in support of this claim—
qui prior est tempore potior est jure—only applies in cases in which the equities are equal.”). 
 195.  A leading treatise states the rule: 
As between interests or claims of a purely equitable character, that is, enforceable in 
equity alone, the rule, as generally stated, is that between equal equities priority of time 
will prevail, that is, they will rank according to their time of accrual.  And the fact that 
the later equity is acquired without notice of the earlier equity is ordinarily immaterial in 
this connection. 
5 TIFFANY, supra note 14, § 1260 (footnote omitted). 
 196.  Plank, supra note 7, at 449 (providing a useful hypothetical to explain that “a transferor 
that has previously conveyed to a transferee all of the transferor’s interests in a property item may 
nevertheless be able to grant to a second transferee an interest in a property item that the transferor 
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understanding that recording systems are market-facilitating.  They assist 
with transactions by providing information that all who wish to engage 
with the property need in order to make informed and economically 
prudent decisions regarding that property.
197
 
So, although nemo dat stands at the foundation of our principle of 
finite property, limited rights, and identification of private ownership, we 
nonetheless have decided that a well-functioning system cannot operate 
if we accept a pure nemo dat regime.  I contend that the American 
system strives through rule discipline to achieve as close to a nemo dat 
reality as possible while recognizing pragmatically that a market in the 
sale of property cannot function with strict and unbending adherence to 
the nemo dat principle.  Thus, exceptions to applying nemo dat must be 
made in the real property transfer system as well as in similar 
commercial enterprises in personal property, goods, securities, and other 
types of owned interests in which certain protections for good faith
198
 or 
bona fide purchaser status become recognized exceptions to nemo dat.
199
  
                                                          
does not have” when certain nemo dat exceptions apply, including when “[t]he operation of the 
recording acts and the failure of A to protect his interests under the recording acts give O the power 
to transfer to B an interest in property—A’s fee simple in Blackacre—that O did not have”) 
(emphasis added). 
 197.  Korngold, Legal and Policy Choices, supra note 128, at 743–44 (explaining the broad 
public need for access to title information because “[c]urrent and potential participants in land 
transfer and finance transactions need information so markets can operate efficiently and fairly, thus 
benefiting those particular players as well as society”). 
 198.  Plank, supra note 7, at 442–443 (discussing good faith purchaser principles as exceptions 
to nemo dat); Steven L. Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk in a Global Economy, 50 DUKE L.J. 1541, 
1573–74 (2001) (“Commercial law generally respects nemo dat (and by extension the axiom) with 
only limited exceptions: that bona fide purchasers of goods and holders in due course of negotiable 
instruments are not necessarily subject to defenses and encumbrances to which the transferor is 
subject.”) (footnote omitted); cf. Levitin, Finding Nemo, supra note 5, at 124–125 (explaining good 
faith purchaser defense in commercial law—comparable to bona fide purchaser status in real 
property law—as “an exception to nemo dat”).  
 199.  Rogers, supra note 184, at 201 (stating similar bona fide purchaser rules exist in negotiable 
instruments law, which functions much like “other legal techniques for the recognition of interests in 
property, such as the recording system or title registration systems for interests in realty, the filing 
system under Article 9 for security interests in personal property, or the certificate of title system for 
motor vehicles”); id. at 198 (discussing “as among the most well-settled principles of commercial 
law: the principle that by virtue of the holder in due course rules a bona fide purchaser of a 
negotiable instrument takes it free from all adverse claims”); see also id. at 199 (“[D]istinguishing 
characteristics of negotiable instruments” include that “a bona fide purchaser can acquire good title 
even from a thief” (citing 8 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 113–14 (1926))).  
Professor Levitin compares negotiability in commercial law to real estate transfers explaining that: 
Nemo dat is the default rule for property transfers, but there is a competing commercial 
law paradigm: negotiability.  Negotiability is usually thought of in terms of Uniform 
Commercial Code Article 3 (negotiable instruments), but it appears in other areas of law, 
including U.C.C. Article 2 (sales), U.C.C. Article 7 (warehouse receipts and bills of 
lading), U.C.C. Article 8 (investment securities), U.C.C. Article 9 (secured loans), and 
the law of real estate mortgages and titles.  The essential characteristic of negotiability is 
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Whether in relation to the transfer of real property or commercial assets, 




The primary exception to the nemo dat principle in real property law 
is the protection of bona fide purchasers’ claims to title when they 
purchase property for value without notice of prior claimants.
201
  The 
bona fide purchaser rule is designed with definiteness and predictability 
in mind, each contributing to investment in property.
202
  The purchaser 
must set forth on a course of due diligence hoping he will find no adverse 
claims,
203
 yet thankful, in a way, if he does find evidence of an adverse 
claim.  He will be thankful if he finds a valid prior titleholder because he 
can move on and elude a potential property pitfall that may have 
ensnared him.  Absent the recording system and the ability to find the 
claimant, he might have been buying something he cannot ever have or 
at the very least he would have faced a risk of potentially costly litigation 
to try to keep title to it. 
The bona fide purchaser is given priority status, superior to the prior 
claim, thereby subordinating the rights of the earlier purchaser.
204
  While 
the notice and race-notice recording regimes across the various states 
continue to recognize the bona fide purchaser rules, those rules are not 
dependent on such statutes.  In fact, the bona fide purchaser protection—
or, to put it more precisely, the inability for a subsequent purchaser to 
                                                          
that only limited defenses travel with property, and thus a transferee can receive more 
than the transferor had—a property right free of certain defenses against its enforcement.  
This means that there is some level of negotiability in any area of law with a good faith 
purchaser defense. 
Levitin, Finding Nemo, supra note 5, at 90 (footnotes omitted). 
 200.  Davis, supra note 4, at 196 (“The nemo dat rule, however, is subject to important 
exceptions in favour of good faith purchasers for value without notice in cases involving currency; 
negotiable instruments; sales by sellers with voidable title; sales by sellers, buyers, or factors in 
possession; and situations in which the true owner is estopped from denying the authority of the 
intermediate transferor.”); Levitin, The Paper Chase, supra note 5, at 641 n.14 (citing several 
doctrinal examples to conclude that: “The UCC is replete with provisions that allow a good-faith 
purchaser to take better title than the seller had, but these are distinct situational exceptions to the 
nemo dat rule. . . . Similarly, there are exceptions to nemo dat in property law.”). 
 201.  Bjerre, supra note 5, at 333 (“Protecting third parties without notice can be viewed as an 
exception to the principle of nemo dat quod non habet . . . .  This principle . . . dictates that if an 
owner transfers widgets to one buyer, she generally may not thereafter transfer the same widgets to a 
later buyer.”). 
 202.  Owen L. Anderson & Charles T. Edin, The Growing Uncertainty of Real Estate Titles, 65 
N.D. L. REV. 1, 46 (1989) (stating bona fide purchaser “rule is grounded in a strong public policy to 
keep land titles definite in order to protect investment and encourage trade”). 
 203.  See Fisher, supra note 19, at 451.  Professor Fisher made the point almost poetically when 
he stated that “title work involves looking through the appropriate records in search of the 
unexpected in hopes that you will not find it.”  Id. 
 204.  See Rogers, supra note 184, at 204. 
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take title to property over a prior claimant if that subsequent purchaser 
has notice of the prior claimant’s rights—existed before the recording 
acts were instituted in the United States.
205
  The rules that one with notice 
has no valid equitable claim were enforced then as a matter of equity and 
continue to be enforced alongside the recording acts on the same 
equitable bases.
206
  Nonetheless, bona fide purchaser rules have also 





 for protecting subsequent bona fide 
purchasers without notice is guarded vigorously in the development of 
legal doctrine.
209
  As one leading treatise puts it, “[t]he law goes a great 
way in protecting the title of a purchaser for value without notice or 
knowledge of any defect in the power of the vendor to sell,”
210
 and as 
another set of authors opined, bona fide purchasers are a “favorite child” 
of the law.
211
  But, similar to the doctrine of “unclean hands” in contract 
law, once it is established that the subsequent purchaser has notice of the 
dirty deed being perpetrated, then his hands are also sufficiently unclean 
that the law will not choose his claim over a prior equitable interest.
212
 
The exceptions to nemo dat in the recording acts are designed to 
                                                          
 205.  5 TIFFANY, supra note 14, § 1258 (“If the equitable interest or claim is first created, the 
question whether one who subsequently acquires the legal title takes free from the equitable interest 
or claim, will ordinarily depend on whether he is a purchaser for value without notice thereof, courts 
of equity refusing to enforce the prior equity as against such a purchaser.”). 
 206.  Id. 
 207.  Schechter, supra note 62, at 109 (“The search for the goals of the recording system begins 
with a simple observation: all real property recording statutes provide that an unrecorded transfer of 
an interest in real property may be invalidated by certain subsequent transferees of conflicting 
interests.”) (footnote omitted). 
 208.  5 TIFFANY, supra note 14, § 1258 (“This principle, that equitable relief will be denied as 
against a purchaser for value and without notice, who has acquired the legal title, is 
fundamental . . . .”). 
 209.  Kumar v. Bay Bridge, LLC, 903 N.E.2d 114, 116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (“The theory behind 
the bona fide purchaser defense is that every reasonable effort should be made to protect a purchaser 
of legal title for a valuable consideration without notice of a legal defect.” (quoting S & S Enters. v. 
Marathon Ashland Petrol., LLC, 799 N.E.2d 18, 23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003))) (emphasis added). 
 210.  5 TIFFANY, supra note 14, § 1552 (discussing priority rules in the recording of mortgages); 
see also id. § 1258 (describing reason to award title to subsequent bona fide purchaser without notice 
as resting on the fact that it is “not unconscientious for him to retain it”); Ortman, supra note 21, at 
466 n.23 (“The theory underlying the Texas recording statutes is that until the grantee records his 
conveyance as required by statute, a power is left in the grantor to displace the prior conveyance.” 
(citing Dwight A. Olds, The Scope of the Texas Recording Act, 8 SW. L.J. 36, 46 (1954))). 
 211.  Anderson & Edin, supra note 202, at 45 (“Traditionally, the bona fide purchaser has been a 
‘favorite child’ under the law.”). 
 212.  5 TIFFANY, supra note 14, § 1258 (stating notice of prior equitable claim makes one 
“unconscientious”); id. § 1283 (explaining the debilitating effect of notice on a subsequent 
purchaser’s ability to make a claim for property is often based on “the theory that one taking a 
conveyance with the purpose of impairing prior rights in another of which he has notice is guilty of 
fraud”). 
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incentivize recording because of the high level of certainty and 
protection that recording provides to those that “perfect” their claim by 
doing so.
213
  There is a very valuable reward to recording that makes it 
worth the minimal effort and low cost.  Recording rules promote 
efficiency and certainty because by recording an owner gets the 
enforceability that comes with public notice of a claim and subsequent 
purchasers are able to discover the claim at a relatively low cost.
214
  The 
entire system (including components related to nemo dat and its 
exceptions) aids a potential purchaser in identifying the strength of the 
rights he is acquiring, allows a seller to confirm that he owns what he 
thinks he owns, and bolsters confidence among potential purchasers that 
the claimed owner has the legal authority to sell what he is attempting to 
sell.
215
  We expect that, with increased reliance through more effective 
verifiability mechanisms, property will be more secure,
216
 and we 
anticipate that recording will also consequently inject more fairness.  




But, it should be clear that by recognizing exceptions to nemo dat we 
create “opportunit[ies] for mischief” and effectuate the dirty deeds of 
“bad actor[s].”
218
  We have hence been required to rely on second-best 
solutions to counteract these risks rather than the arguably first-best 
option of applying nemo dat. 
We might fashion the dilemma as one where the first-best system 
would involve full application of the nemo dat principle (consequently 
avoiding or at least mitigating the harmful effects of the bad actors, 
fraudulent activity, and incomplete information that we actually see in 
the world).
219
  While we would prefer first-best solutions that might 
                                                          
 213.  See ANDERSON & BOGART, supra note 17, at 548 (explaining the “purpose of recording 
statutes is to strongly incentivize” recording); cf. Plank, supra note 7, at 450–51 (discussing nemo 
dat and recording of security interests). 
 214.  Id., at 450 (explaining the consequences for securities markets for similar nemo dat rules 
and exceptions). 
 215.  Id. at 505 (explaining the assurances to multiple market participants that “[b]oth nemo dat 
and the exceptions to nemo dat enacted in the real estate recording acts and Article 9, such as the 
Filing Priority Principle, are intended to provide”). 
 216.  Id. at 450 (explaining recording acts “override[] nemo dat . . . to promote the ‘security of 
property’”). 
 217.  Mitchel McInnes, Enrichments and Reasons for Restitution: Protecting Freedom of 
Choice, 48 MCGILL L.J. 419, 453 n.137 (2003) (“[T]he law wishes, as a matter of fairness and 
commercial reality, to occasionally create exceptions to the general rule of nemo dat quod non 
habet.”). 
 218.  Levitin, Finding Nemo, supra note 5, at 90–91. 
 219.  Plank, supra note 7, at 455–56 (categorizing nemo dat in a manner consistent with the idea 
that it is a first-best option). 
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prevent the sale of previously conveyed property, in light of the 
principles supporting the nemo dat exceptions, we must be satisfied with 
second-best solutions to control, deter, and punish wrongdoers—while 
using the second-best solutions to also make those that necessarily must 
lose any claim to a finite piece of property (for which we can only 
choose a single winner to whom to award possession and ownership) as 
close to whole as possible. 
Second-best rules accept the necessity of a relaxation of the first-best 
preferences.
220
  Among these is the protection of first recorded interests.  
Those rules attempt to approximate the conditions that would reach the 
nemo dat ideal.  Deed covenants and warranties of title and similar 
means of title assurance also exist as second-best measures to protect 
against loss from multiple sales of the same property.
221
  A variety of 
other anti-fraud devices are available in private and criminal law.
222
  
Knowing that we cannot make every purchaser of property whole in the 
face of multiple conveyances of the same property, the system satisfies 
itself with the ability to punish and deter those that create title chaos 
through the passing of dirty deeds using civil and criminal liability.
223
 
Furthermore, the reliance on the recording systems to achieve our 
preferences is itself a second-best option.  If one desires to award title to 
all good faith purchasers (including the person who purchases the 
property first) and to prevent owners from selling property twice, strict 
                                                          
 220.  Lawrence B. Solum, The Aretaic Turn in Constitutional Theory, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 475, 
486 (2004–05) (describing the ideas behind first-best or preferred systems that because of 
unattainability of control over all variables necessitates acceptance of a second-best system with 
application of second-best values (citing R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of 
Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956))). 
 221.  See SINGER, supra note 13, § 11.4.3, at 534–36 (explaining title covenants); see also 
Charles B. Sheppard, Assurances of Titles to Real Property Available in the United States: Is a 
Person Who Assures a Quality of Title to Real Property Liable for a Defect in the Title Caused by 
Conduct of the Assured?, 79 N.D. L. REV. 311, 314 (2003) (describing several types of title 
assurance beyond recording including covenants or warranties of title in contracts of sale and deeds; 
abstracts of title; attorney opinions, along with corresponding liabilities; and title insurance). 
 222.  Schechter, supra note 62, at 111 n.26 (“The relative importance of the recording system as 
a vehicle for preventing or deterring fraud may have been diminished somewhat with the growth of 
other anti-fraud devices such as the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act, civil damages for fraud, and criminal penalties for fraud.”). 
 223.  See, e.g., Smith v. State, 98 So. 586, 588 (Fla. 1923) (upholding guilty verdict in “false 
pretenses” case where seller made representation that “‘the property was free and there was nothing 
against it,’ when in fact he had previously joined with his wife in executing a mortgage on the 
property . . . for which he would be criminally liable if he obtained from another any money or other 
property thereby”); cf. State v. Banks, 211 S.E.2d 860, 862 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975) (upholding 
conviction when purchaser replied on representations and defendant signed and delivered deed and 
accepted purchaser’s money knowing that he was falsely representing that the property was free of 
encumbrances). 
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adherence to nemo dat may be the first-best option.  But that requires 
honesty and non-fraudulent—indeed even non-mistaken—behavior so 
that property is never sold more than once to more than an initial 
purchaser.  It would also require that there is never an innocent 
subsequent purchaser who purchases without notice of a competing 
claimant.  The necessary conditions for achieving the desired results do 
not exist and therefore negate choosing the first-best solution of strict 
adherence to nemo dat as a means for achieving those results.
224
  Because 
these elements may be lacking in one way or another in the real world, 
strict adherence to nemo dat is not the most viable means to accomplish 
such desires.  Hence, we adopt the second-best option seen in recording 
statutes that seek to motivate all purchasers to take acts (beyond just the 
purchase itself) to protect their interests, and, in particular, we set priority 
rules that may deviate from nemo dat-like first-in-time principles as our 
second-best options to more closely accomplish the desired ends.
225
  The 
recording act exceptions to nemo dat, joined with alternative 
enforcement mechanisms to deter bad behavior and make whole the 
innocents, operate as a system of second-best rules. 
Again, we must admit that these exceptions technically permit a 
transferor to transfer something “that the transferor no longer has 
because the transferor previously transferred that interest to a prior 
transferee, with the result that the original owner or a prior transferee 
may lose some or all of the same property interest.”
226
  The recording 
acts specifically dilute the effectiveness of nemo dat in this regard.
227
 
The exceptions to nemo dat are necessitated by the existence of a 
market failure in the production and availability of information.  We only 
need to protect subsequent bona fide purchasers and subordinate first-in-
time titleholders because of imperfect information flow regarding the 
first sale.  If we can find ways to provide a greater-sized repository of 
accurate information accessible at a low enough cost, we are achieving a 
more efficient market. 
                                                          
 224.  Cf. Daniel E. Schoeni, Second-Best Markets: On the Hidden Efficiency of Defense Offsets, 
44 PUB. CONT. L.J. 369, 397–98 (2015) (providing some very useful examples of real-world second-
best alternatives to “blackboard”-based first-best options). 
 225.  Id. at 397 (citing Making the Second Best of It, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 21, 2007), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2007/08/making_the_second_best_of_it). 
 226.  Plank, supra note 7, at 442–43 (discussing exceptions to nemo dat “which apply in a 
variety of real and personal property regulatory regimes” as enabling this result). 
 227.  Nelson v. Hughes, 625 P.2d 643, 647 (Or. 1981) (describing a case involving two sales of 
same property, and Professor Corwin Johnson’s conclusion that “one of the purposes of the 
recording acts is to modify the traditional common law doctrine that subsequent purchasers, no 
matter how bona fide, get no better title than the transferor owned”). 
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For these reasons, we should always be looking for ways to shrink 
the application of the exceptions without necessarily changing the 
criteria for eligibility to claim the exception.  The goal should be to make 
fewer claimants fit the criteria to except application of nemo dat—
something which is best accomplished by injecting information 
accurately, more often, and at quicker paces than we are doing today. 
While exceptions to it are common,
228
 the law still accepts nemo dat 
as the baseline
229
 and the norm from which we carve out exceptions.
230
  
Because nemo dat should be that baseline for identifying the legitimacy 
of land transfers, we should manage property rules to most closely 
maximize our ideal adherence to it.
231
  We should presume in favor of 
(or, as some might say have a “thumb on the scale” in favor of) 
application of nemo dat wherever practical and efficient.
232
 
V. A PRELIMINARY PROPOSAL FOR EXPLOITING THE UNDERUTILIZED 
UTILITY OF INQUIRY NOTICE— 
TINTS: THE TITLE-RELATED INQUIRY NOTICE TRIGGERING SYSTEM 
The goals of the recording system should include accuracy, 
completeness of information, speed in uploading facts and events into 
public memory and in transmission of information, and the utmost 
protection and enforceability of interests in land.
233
  If we could protect 
first-in-time takers better by concomitantly decreasing those eligible for 
bona fide purchaser status simply because we give more people more 
information that exhibits a higher degree of completeness and accuracy, 
it seems that we would achieve those goals. 
The utility and desirability of record notice is a given, and it should 
be encouraged at every step.  Every prudent purchaser of property must 
be encouraged to record and we should find every way possible to make 
that system more accurate, efficient, user-friendly, and quick-on-the-
                                                          
 228.  Smith, supra note 11, at 2121 (“In practice, exceptions to nemo dat apply often, if not most 
of the time” especially as a result of the recording statutes) (emphasis added). 
 229.  Id. at 2123 (“[N]emo dat . . . covers a heterogeneous set of circumstances that reflect its 
being the general baseline, however compromised it may be in practice.”) (emphasis added). 
 230.  Id. at 2122 (explaining that this baseline approach allows the exceptions to be grouped 
within “the generality of good faith purchase as a unitary rule” capturing the essence of most 
exceptions to nemo dat including those applicable to bona fide purchasers).  
 231.  Levitin, Finding Nemo, supra note 5, at 99 (“Nemo dat is the baseline rule of property 
transfers.”) (emphasis added). 
 232.  Plank, supra note 7, at 462 (“Absent a good reason to overrule nemo dat, nemo dat should 
prevail.”). 
 233.  Korngold, Resolving, supra note 18, at 1564 (“[R]ecording acts and related rules” focused 
on accuracy and accessibility of information to protect interests in land). 
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upload to the public space.  Nonetheless, inquiry notice is an additional 
and underexploited protective tool, especially during gap periods 
between a title commitment and actual indexing and recording. 
The risk that a grantor will sell dirty deeds during such gaps is real.  
As one author explains, “[t]he recording process, from submission to 
recording, takes time, and there is often a delay, or gap, between when 
the document is submitted to the recorder’s office and when that 
document is officially recorded and indexed.”
234
  While title insurance 
may exist during such gaps,
235
 it is expensive, incomplete, and does not 
actually deter the bad behavior or inject information into the system that 
can prevent the inefficient passing of, and payment for, dirty deeds.
236
  It 
is especially during these gaps when the recording system and first-in-
time purchasers are most vulnerable and when we can easily see prime 
opportunities for multiple sales of the same property in violation of the 
nemo dat ideal. 
Often for good reasons and sometimes in spite of itself, real property 
law has not been known as a fast adapter to change or the first to 
embrace innovative techniques.
237
  But when a good idea comes along 
that can effectuate what are time-honored, preferred outcomes, like the 
minimization of fraudulent transfers and finding ways to achieve full 




                                                          
 234.  Jessica Kopplin Kranz, Note, Expedition E-Recording, First Stop URPERA: How 
Universal E-Recording Under URPERA Could Revolutionize Real Estate Recording in the United 
States and Why It Should, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 383, 387 (2012); see also Justin L. Earley & 
James B. Jordan, Understanding Interim Title Insurance Documents (With Forms), 27 No. 2 PRAC. 
REAL EST. LAW. 41, 42–43 (2011) (discussing the very real risks associated with potential adverse 
claims being filed in the gap period, possibly subordinating interests of a titleholder). 
 235.  John C. Murray, Attorney Malpractice in Real Estate Transactions: Is Title Insurance the 
Answer?, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 221, 236 (2007) (discussing American Land Title 
Association forms provisions for gap insurance and explaining that the “gap risk occurs when a title 
policy states an effective date, but the deed or mortgage is actually recorded later, which raises the 
possibility of an intervening lien attaching and being recorded before the deed or mortgage, thereby 
cutting off the priority of the insured interest”). 
 236.  Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Adopting Restatement Mortgage Subrogation 
Principles: Saving Billions of Dollars for Refinancing Homeowners, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 305, 362 
(2006) (“If lenders cannot get title insurance expenses down to acceptable levels, they are likely to 
dispense with title insurance entirely, becoming self-insurers.”).  
 237.  See, e.g., Ann M. Burkhart, Freeing Mortgages of Merger, 40 VAND. L. REV. 283, 284 
(1987) (“Change in real property law often occurs with glacial speed.  This rate of change in part 
reflects the normal inertia of established law.  A more complete explanation, however, is the innate 
conservatism connected to a commodity that once was the primary source of wealth and power.”). 
 238.  Szypszak, Real Estate Records, supra note 15, at 39 (noting that we should look for 
“opportunities for improvement, especially in a market and technological environment that could not 
have been envisioned when the present system was developed”). 
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We should be asking innovators to harness technology and the power 
of inquiry notice to inject information and better preserve the rights of 
first-in-time purchasers.  Recording systems in the United States are 
based on out-dated methods that fail to capture the benefits of 
technology, so every proposal designed to capitalize on available and 
emerging technology to better distribute title information is worth 
considering.
239
  Many have already recognized that computerized 
recording systems themselves can decrease information-gathering costs 
and reduce errors in a way that shrinks the pool of legitimate bona fide 
purchasers.
240
  Although some efforts are being made to use technology 




There is an opportunity to fill gaps in recording with the type of 
information that can trigger inquiry notice—an under-exploited tool 
available to every first-in-time purchaser to protect their interests above 
and beyond the records office.  This Part sketches the basic outline of a 
system I will call TINTS—the “Title-Related Inquiry Notice Triggering 
System.” 
The reform envisioned by TINTS is to provide a computerized 
mechanism for early public warning of a title claim even before any such 
claim is recorded and indexed in the public records office.  In other 
words, because it will not constitute any type of official “record,” the 
information provided by TINTS is something short of constructive 
notice.  Instead, it is something less formal because it is only a triggering 
                                                          
 239.  See Dale A. Whitman, Are We There Yet? The Case for a Uniform Electronic Recording 
Act, 24 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 245, 246–50 (2002) (discussing the mechanics of recording, with 
analysis of reform proposals and prospects for and concerns with such efforts); see generally Dale A. 
Whitman, Digital Recording of Real Estate Conveyances, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 227 (1999) 
(identifying a wide range of issues that need to be addressed in order to implement a digital 
recording system). 
 240.  See, e.g., Martin B. Cowan, Introducing Twentieth-Century Technology to Real Estate 
Recording Practices (Before the Twenty-First Century Arrives), 28 REAL EST. L.J. 99, 120–21 
(1999) (discussing streamlining and efficiencies that are possible by harnessing technology and why 
“[w]ith today’s technology, there is no reason to continue using such time-consuming and frustrating 
procedures” as we have for hundreds of years in records offices); see also Bayer-Pacht, supra note 
17, at 358, 369 (discussing the utility of “computerized systems” that “serve the same underlying 
purpose as” recording doctrines that have an ease that make it less necessary to protect subsequent 
purchasers because there will be fewer risks undiscoverable or “irregularly recorded deeds”); see 
also UNIF. REAL PROP. ELEC. RECORDING ACT (UNIFORM LAW COMM’N 2004), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Real%20Property%20Electronic%20Recording%20Act. 
 241.  Korngold, Legal and Policy Choices, supra note 128, at 740–41 (discussing the current 
property recording system as still paper-based but improving with the growth of “technology to 
make the recording system more efficient, more transparent, and less costly,” and discussing 
developments in electronic signatures law as furthering the efforts); Marsh, supra note 124, at 20–24 
(discussing improving ways to find and search property records). 
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mechanism for further inquiry.  It is also designed to have the advantage 
of providing information to the market more immediately than any type 
of official “notice” of an actual conflict in title while also raising enough 
concern that inquiry notice standards will apply even if what is revealed 
in TINTS cannot be deemed record or constructive notice.  The system 
could be designed so that information can be both instantly uploaded and 
examined through a smart-phone application and internet website. 
The point would be to allow purchasers to notify the world of the 
existence of their title claim to a particular piece of property immediately 
upon the completion of a conveyance from the grantor.  The claim would 
be up for inquiry notice prior to the completion of posting of record 
notice in the records office.  In this sense, it might be seen as operating 
during the pendency of the recording in a manner similar to the way lis 
pendens works for providing notice of pending litigation over claims of 
interest in real property.
242
  Exposure of claims has long been the goal of 
the title systems and in that sense, TINTS can, like recording itself, serve 
as a notoriety-assistance mechanism.
243
 
As a matter of due diligence, all purchasers of real property would be 
required to check TINTS to see if any others have claimed an interest in 
the property, separate and apart from what is yet available in the records 
office.  This could rise to the level of accepted “due diligence” by custom 
(which obviously might take some time but is a real possibility because 
courts have consistently recognized that customs can ripen into duties).
244
  
Or, rather than waiting for custom to develop, a statutory mandate might 
be enacted that makes it a requirement for all purchasers to check TINTS 
as a prerequisite to eligibility for bona fide purchaser status.  Thus, 
TINTS could operate as a private system, as a private system with a 
public mandate, or as a public system with a public mandate. 
What constitutes due diligence under the law will be shaped by the 
ease and availability of information and the technology to deliver it.  As 
one court recently explained on the question whether purchasers in that 
                                                          
 242.  Cf. Goldstein v. Gold, 483 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377–78 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (“[P]urchaser is 
charged with constructive notice of litigation if he [or she] fails to record the deed prior to the filing 
of the notice of pendency.”); cf. id. at 381 (Magano and Eber, JJ., concurring) (discussing effects of 
notice of unrecorded interests and denial of “priority to the party who wins the race to record his 
deed or encumbrance, but does so with knowledge of an unrecorded interest”); cf.  Plank, supra note 
7, at 455–56 (discussing “ability to base priority on a filing that precedes attachment and perfection” 
in securities law). 
 243.  Cf. Scheid, supra note 13, at 102 (“The recording acts promote the notoriety of land 
ownership and preserve the muniments of title by encouraging grantees to record their deeds.”). 
 244.  See Neslin v. Wells, 104 U.S. 428, 434 (1881) (surveying custom-to-duty development 
cases involving real property and title information issues). 
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case could be said to have constructive notice, notice requirements are 
context-driven and when the computerization of land records “lightens 
for the purchaser the burden which existed only a few years ago,” then 
“[w]hat in the past may have been considered a diligent search may no 
longer be so considered because of the ease of retrieving computerized 
information relevant to encumbrances on property.”
245
  If you make the 
technology, it will matter.
246
 
Whether ripening into a custom over time (as so many other prudent 
real estate practices have before)
247
 or perhaps by statutory mandate, it 
could become common and mandatory practice for all purchasers and 
real estate professionals to consult TINTS whenever making a purchase 
to see if any allegedly-prior claimants had posted and staked a claim to 
inquiry notice on the system.  Of course, concomitantly, it should 
become customary for the rational purchaser to also post and stake their 
claim on the system even before the records office has their claim up.  
One advantage of TINTS is that the information could be uploaded 
immediately post-closing, drastically outpacing actual recording of title 
and filling the information void during gaps in recording time. 
If a purchaser finds an adverse competing claim on TINTS, then a 
red flag goes up, and the law could recognize that the subsequent 
purchaser is now on inquiry notice and must conduct a reasonable 
investigation into the legitimacy of the possible competing claim before 
becoming entitled to seek the status of bona fide purchaser without 
notice.  The most common type of inquiry notice trigger under the law is 
possession of the property by one other than the grantor, but inquiry 
notice is a broader category than those types of factual scenarios and also 
includes all situations where “a purchaser has actual or constructive 
knowledge of facts that would have led a reasonable person to inquire 
further” about possible title conflicts.
248
  A TINTS entry would satisfy as 
                                                          
 245.  First Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Sherwood, 817 A.2d 501, 505 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003), rev’d on 
other grounds, 879 A.2d 178 (Pa. 2005). 
 246.  Cf. Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. L. 
REV. 1597, 1629 (2008) (describing “numerous technological and policy changes in the past half 
century that have lowered information costs relating to property transactions,” including title 
insurance). 
 247.  Neslin, 104 U.S. at 437–38 (discussing several precedents where “effect was given to the 
existence of a known custom, in creating an obligation”). 
 248.  3 PALOMAR, supra note 13, § 673 (triggering inquiry notice by matters in the record as well 
as facts learned outside the record); see also Long John Silver’s, Inc. v. Fiore, 386 A.2d 569, 573 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (explaining where party admitted actual knowledge of prior purchaser claiming 
an interest in the property, duty to inquire attached where “subsequent purchaser could have learned 
of facts that may affect his title by inquiry of persons in possession or others who the purchaser 
reasonably believes know such facts”). 
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such a trigger. 
TINTS takes advantage of the power of inquiry notice, empowering 
first-in-time purchasers to immediately spark the suspicion, raise the red 
flag, and alert all other would-be purchasers that a claim is being made 
on the property and that record notice is on its way.  Filing a notice in 
TINTS would put a literal “tint” on the title requiring any other purchaser 
to investigate the source and legitimacy of that tint.  It operates like an 
early warning system about the possibility of contested title, with the 
goal of fitting such warnings into our understanding of what constitutes a 
reasonable inquiry and setting as a prerequisite that a TINTS entry can 
serve as inquiry notice only when a full investigation of the TINTS entry 
would otherwise provide one with all the information necessary to 




As a quality control and verifiability mechanism, uploading parties 
might be required to upload further information—such as the executed 
contract of sale and deed—within a short period of time after the initial 
entry (perhaps 5 days) to provide more solid evidence of their claim and 
the failure to do so could make their initial posting expire and render it 
ineffective for providing notice.  Further steps could be required to keep 
the posting on TINTS and might even work to encourage recording.  For 
example, an individual with a TINTS claim could be required to upload 
to TINTS a stamped copy of the deed as-filed in the recording office 
within a certain period of time (perhaps 3 months) or, again, if he fails to 
do so and does not keep the claim fresh and updated with increasingly 
higher-quality information then the party’s TINTS posting will expire, 
disappear, and become ineffective at providing any type of notice. 
Of course, the problem with more robust inquiry notice triggering is 
that it may add inefficient delays or even thwart the completion of 
desirable property transactions.  Some may worry that adding burdens to 
purchasers to discover information could have negative effects on the 
market for land—increasing the cost of acquisition to the point that it 
pushes some purchasers out or so that it otherwise unjustifiably distorts 
and inflates the price of property.
250
 
                                                          
 249.  One would expect that title standards would develop as well to help identify the duties and 
liabilities of lawyers and others in using TINTS and to influence the practice and behavior of those 
involved in issuing title opinions and otherwise searching for verification of title.   
 250.  Korngold, Resolving, supra note 18, at 1564 (worrying about “chill[ing] future market 
transactions” and concluding that “the rules should not unfairly favor current owners over successor 
buyers and should not place excessive or irrational search burdens on potential future buyers”); but 
see id. at 1567 n.190 (arguing that inquiry notice might be out-dated and too expensive but 
seemingly limiting it to physical inspection-based inquiry notice and not necessarily inquiry notice 
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And, there are potential risks of abuse in such a system that could 
themselves have market-disrupting effects.  For example, the risk of a 
fraudulent filing on TINTS to disrupt the market or harm a competitor is 
real
251
—even if it is just to post for purposes of delaying a property 
transaction by a few days to gain some kind of competitive advantage—
and any full development of a system like TINTS would need to spend 
substantial time developing safeguards against such abuses.  Any 
TINTS-like system would need to find ways to prohibit adding costs to 
property transfers by those who might simply file fraudulent claims of 
purchase inside TINTS to muck up or slow down someone else’s ability 
to buy property, to delay an owner’s ability to sell, or to extract 
extortion-like payments from those whose actions they might seek to 
block through TINTS.  It is imperative that safeguards are in place to 
prevent TINTS-like systems from being used to facilitate fraud. 
Certainly though, inquiry notice is not subject to a hair trigger, and 
rumor alone, for example, should not spark the duty to inquire;
252
 there 
should be ways to require a minimum level of detail and content for any 
TINTS posting to cross a legitimacy threshold.  The parties uploading 
claims should be required to register with TINTS, including providing 
reliable contact information that can be used by a prospective buyer to 
conduct his inquiry.  Failure to provide accurate information could also 
be deemed as a forfeiture of any claim of notice by this method.  A fee 
structure could be included that would serve as means of receiving more 
reliable information and to deter fraudulent uploading of claims.  The 
goal must be to fit TINTS within the scope, and subject to the same 
limitations, of what we define as the effort and diligence necessary to 
                                                          
that would be triggered by other methods like “questions raised by recorded documents, since that 
may not greatly expand the buyer’s burden”). 
 251.  Professor Szypszak explains some of the motivations to engage in abuse of recording 
systems: 
The increased availability of information in modern society presents an opportunity for 
those who wish to harm others through fraud, false claims, and annoyance.  The threat to 
the real estate records is a serious part of this development, because the potential impact 
of a fraudulent or frivolous real estate filing can interfere with a transaction involving 
substantial investments, or impair someone’s capacity to obtain credit . . . Although the 
frivolous nature of these instruments is readily apparent, the instruments can nonetheless 
cause harm to the target by holding up a transaction or impairing credit while the 
instrument is investigated. 
Szypszak, North Carolina, supra note 24, at 225–26; see also Szypszak, Real Estate Records, supra 
note 15, at 38 (“At common law someone whose property rights are harmed by false claims might 
have a cause of action for slander of title.”). 
 252.  5 TIFFANY, supra note 14, § 1285 (explaining that for inquiry notice to be triggered, buyer 
must receive “information . . . sufficient to furnish a basis for investigation, and a mere rumor or 
indefinite statement that there is an adverse claim is not sufficient to put one on inquiry”). 
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conduct a reasonable inquiry. 
Other safeguards might also be developed.  For example, individuals 
might contract with sellers to incentivize sellers to upload the 
transactional information, adding more reliability and transparency.  
Such contracts might even include remedies for failure to comply with a 
TINTS uploading agreement term.  The system could require both buyer 
and seller to upload before the posting goes public.  There might be a 
requirement that the purchaser provide seller information before making 
an entry eligible for public posting.  The company or government agency 
running TINTS might have individuals policing and verifying TINTS 
postings, including perhaps checking validity by contacting the previous 
owner/seller to get concurrence in information provided by the supposed 
purchaser and, if they do not concur, perhaps the posting is then pulled 
(or never posted).  These and other possible safeguards should be 
brainstormed and responses to potential abuses developed in conjunction 
with the development of the system. 
TINTS would give first-in-time buyers an additional opportunity to 
protect their interests to the property by providing additional information 
to the public sphere that should be accessible to would-be subsequent 
purchasers such that those subsequent purchasers will be on inquiry 
notice of a claim by the previous purchaser even before it is feasible to 
have all of the relevant information recorded and indexed in the local 
records office. 
The purpose here is only to propose and outline the concept of one 
approach toward minimizing the potential for grantors selling to two or 
more individuals and getting away with it due to nemo dat exceptions.  
My hope is that ideas will be generated to make the TINTS idea 
operational, and that the presentation of the TINTS idea might spark 
other innovative proposals.  On TINTS itself, future work is required to 
develop the full details of a model for effective implementation with 
appropriate safeguards against abuse. 
TINTS addresses problems that are primarily exacerbated by the 
continuing predominance of paper-based recording offices (for 
searching, filing, and indexing).  Perhaps the traditional land records 
system will give way over time (and hopefully more rapidly and 
uniformly) to universal electronic recording systems that might make 
something like TINTS unnecessary if the new electronic recording 
regime manages to make recording and searching capabilities essentially 
instantaneous, thereby eliminating the gaps that TINTS is designed to 
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address.  At present, jurisdictions across the country have demonstrated 
dramatically different dedications of resources to converting their offices 
to electronic recording.
253
  Until resource priorities change and a more 
robust and widespread push is advanced for electronic recording, gaps 
will remain in effective recording times which TINTS or other fixes must 
address. 
In all of our efforts to innovate, we should have as a goal the 
minimization of barriers to the law’s ability to say that one truly cannot 
sell what they have previously sold.  Finding new and reliable ways to 
inject information into the marketplace so that fewer purchasers are blind 
to adverse claimants should be a primary objective.  TINTS, or other 
innovations like it, can assist us in matching these nemo dat preferences 
with property law pragmatism.  
                                                          
 253.  See supra notes 239–241 and accompanying text. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Most people think we live in a nemo dat world—where one can only 
sell as much as they have and that once they sell something to one person 
they cannot turn around and sell it again to someone else.  As this Article 
illustrates, that nemo dat world is something that we strive for but that 
the law realizes is not realistically attainable.  So, although nemo dat 
stands at the foundation of our property system, so too do a variety of 
other pragmatic values influence the development of property and title 
law, including those associated with fairness to innocent purchasers, our 
desires to motivate individuals to record and make public their claims to 
title, and our hopes to maximize the market-facilitating effects that our 
recording system provides.  Therefore, exceptions to applying nemo dat 
must be made in the real property transfer system.  We have to allow 
some bad actors to do dirty deeds by passing dirty deeds to subsequent 
purchasers and hope that we can contain that undesirable and destructive 
activity in other ways. 
Nonetheless, fuller adherence to the nemo dat idea should be 
something that we strive toward—not by changing the nature of the 
protections available to innocent bona fide purchasers, but instead—by 
finding new ways to inject a higher degree of reliable, verifiable title 
information into the market and doing so at a more rapid rate.  We 
should aim to closely approximate a nemo dat world.  We should 
innovate in ways that help us best match our nemo dat preferences with 
the understanding that we must always account for the pragmatic needs 
of our property system if we wish that system to function well. 
 
